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New Light on the Legislative
History of Desertion Through
Fraudulent Enlistment: The
Decline of the United States
Court of Military Appeals
In this Article, Professor Avins, the author of several
penetrating articles in the field of military law, takes to
task the United States Court of Military Appeals. He does
so by analyzing two recent decisions of that judicial body
which the author feels are typical of its work product.
The cases involve the offense commonly referred to as
fraudulent re-enlistment. Whether such offense, under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, is an offense sep-
arate from general desertion and whether the intent to
remain absent permanently is required to constitute such
offense are questions which call for thorough historical
and legal analysis. Professor Avins, as you will soon dis-
cover, treats them accordingly.
Alfred Avins*
I. THE WORK PRODUCT OF THE COURT OF
MILITARY APPEALS
Substantive military law is the domain of the specialist. Few
civilian attorneys practice it; and even a considerable number of
officers in the several Judge Advocate General's branches of the
armed services are occupied with legal work of a quasi-civil na-
ture, such as claims, contracts, or legal assistance. Among judge
advocates who are concerned with court-martial work, many find
that a large proportion of their most important cases are civil-
type crimes such as murder, larceny, or similar offenses found in
* Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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civil codes. Even when, in time of peace, a military law offense
does come before a court-martial where lawyers are present, it is
apt to be a clear-cut case presenting few legal questions, such as
a lengthy absence without leave. It is therefore not surprising that
only minimal attention has been paid to military law in legal pe-
riodicals. Indeed, out of 57 articles appearing in the first 11 num-
bers of the Military Law Review, only 3 dealt with substantive
military offenses.
The malfunctioning of an important federal agency, on the
other hand, is of concern to all lawyers. The mere fact that only a
relative handful of practitioners ever appear before the Federal
Power Commission or the Federal Communications Commission,
and the fact that these agencies deal with a highly specialized area
of law and regulate a very narrow area of the economy, properly
did not deter lawyers, as well as the general public, from taking a
keen interest in the performance of these agencies in the last
several years when their inadequacies were laid bare. The interest
on the part of lawyers in general, though they may never appear
before a regulatory agency, in the broad plans of the new adminis-
tration for the reorganization of these agencies is a proper reflec-
tion of the concern which lawyers ought to feel for the adequate
performance of the work of such tribunals even though they do not
directly affect their law practice.
As the "G.I.'s Supreme Court," the Court of Military Appeals'
work product affects far more people, both lawyers and non-law-
yers, than do the activities of the regulatory agencies which have
been in the public limelight so often. Accordingly, lawyers gen-
erally should not eschew examination of the activity of the court
merely because its products are made for specialized consumption.
Should lawyers in general, and those in the new administration
in particular, examine the work of the Court of Military Appeals
with care, it would become painfully obvious that this tribunal is
badly in need of urgent rejuvenation. For the past several years,
students of the court's work could not help but notice that the
quality of its judicial product has been going downhill at an in-
creasingly accelerated rate. The symptoms of this progressively in-
ferior work performance have been criticized from a number of
angles. Commentators have attacked the court for reading its own
notions into the Uniform Code of Military Justice,' for discarding
its own decisions without adequate consideration or cause,2 for
1. Miller, Who Made the Law Officer a "Federal Judge"?, 4 MILITARY
L. REv. 39 (1959).
2. Murphy, The Army Defense Counsel: Unusual Ethics for an Unusual
Advocate, 61 COLUM. L. Rnv. 233, 246 (1961).
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overturning, with almost reckless abandon, provisions of the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial,3 and substantive military law rules of the
most ancient vintage,4 for creating instability in the administration
of the military law,' and even for abuse of power.6 Indeed, one
writer suggested that appellate counsel appearing before the court
be closely controlled and supervised as a last desperate measure to
prevent the court's complete demise as a useful institution.7 Thus,
it is clear that instead of contributing to the professionalization of
military lawyers by setting a high standard of excellence, the Court
of Military Appeals threatens not only the destruction of its own
utility, but also the impairment of the efficiency of the Judge Ad-
vocate General's departments as well.
The above-mentioned attacks on the court, in this writer's esti-
mation, treat only of the symptoms of the court's decline. More-
over, by so doing, they invite a point-by-point refutation by the
court's apologists which tends to obscure the major defect in a
mire of details and side controversies.' These controversies are
only tangential to the main affliction of -the Court of Military Ap-
peals which is that the court is turning out a second-rate work
product substantially below the minimum norm, in both learning
and analysis, which should be required of every judicial tribunal,
especially the court of last resort working in a specialized field.
A demonstration of the above statement by analyzing every
case decided by the Court of Military Appeals in the last several
years would take a shelf full of volumes of sizeable proportions.
Moreover, such an inquiry would serve no useful purpose. In many
cases the court pretends that Congress gave it a blank check to
start from scratch, and to ignore prior learning and reasoning in
the military law,9 and hence an inquiry into the prior military law
3. Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice: A Critical
Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv.
861, 885 (1959); Richardson, A State of War and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 47 A.B.A.J. 792, 796 (1961).
4. Avins, Proof of Desertion Through Prolonged Absence, 44 CORNELL
L.Q. 356 (1959).
5. Report to the Secretary of the Army, dated January 18, 1960, by the
ad hoc Committee to Study the Uniform Code of Military Justice 193-95
(1960).
6. Herbert, The Status of Spouses as Witnesses Before Courts-Martial,
II MiLiTARY L. REV. 141, 186 (1961).
7. Ibid.
8. See Neff, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice, 30 JAA. J.
6 (June, 1960).
9. United States v. Day, 11 U.S.C.M.A 549, 29 C.M.R. 365 (1960);
Cf. Judge Ferguson dissenting in United States v. Bryant, 12 U.S.C.M.A.
133, 141, 30 C.M.R. 133, 141 (1961): "[i]t is difficult to perceive the
relevance of authorities such as Winthrop in construing a statute passed by
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would no doubt be met by the argument that Congress has swept
away such law. In others, decisions are often premised on suppos-
ed policy considerations which, however dubious they may be, do
not readily lend themselves to an analysis of the court's work
product."
The quality of a judicial tribunal's work often can best be ex-
amined by dissecting a single decision. It is true, of course, that
one case can hardly establish the record of an institution. How-
ever, it often happens that a case can be found which illustrates, in
microcosm, the way in which the body is performing generally.
An examination of such a case in detail is more profitable than
an at-large, spot-check survey of the body's work in general. Given
the proper case, the deficiencies of the Court of Military Appeals
can be laid bare.
Article 85 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides, in
part, that a member of the armed forces who "without being regu-
larly separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an
appointment in the same or another one of the armed forces with-
out fully disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separ-
ated, or enters any foreign armed service except when authorized
by the United States, is guilty of desertion."" The Manual for
Courts-Martial indicates that this form of desertion does not nec-
essarily require an intent to remain away permanently from
the initial status,' 2 a result which would clearly appear to follow
from the plain language of the statute. Nevertheless, in two com-
panion cases, the United States Court of Military Appeals held that
this statutory provision does not create an offense separate from
straight desertion,' 3 and that an intent to remain permanently ab-
sent is required for this offense.'
These companion cases are useful for dissection for a number of
reasons. First, both of them were decided unanimously, unlike a
number of recent controversial opinions which divided the court.
Moreover, each one was written by a different member of the
court, and the one judge who did not author one of the opinions
has, in addition to his concurrence, more recently cited these hold-
a deliberative assembly concerned with abolishing so many of the former
practices of the armed services."
10 See, e.g., United States v. Bridges, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 96, 30 C.M.R.
96 (1961).
11. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 85(a) (3), 10 U.S.C.
§ 885(a) (3).
12. M uAL. FOR COURTs-MARTIAL, U.S. 1951, 164(a); Exec. Or-
der No. 10214, 16 Fed. Reg. 1303 (1951).
13. United States v. Johnson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 17 C.M.R. 297 (1954).
14. United States v. Huff, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 22 C.M.R. 37 (1956).
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ings with approval.'" Hence, these cases are in every sense insti-
tutional decisions. Second, these cases purport to be based solely
on the historical pedigree of the applicable statute. Therefore, there
is no problem of disagreement about policy considerations or
whether Congress intended to change the statute. Third, the first
decision by the court provoked a thoughtful rebuttal by a board of
review." Thus, the court had a second opportunity to give care-
ful consideration to its holding. Fourth, this is one of the cases
which a careful scholar in this field criticizes for overturning a
Manual provision without justification.'" This should have caused
the court to act with special care, and its failure to do so is symp-
tomatic of other cases overturning Manual provisions without good
cause. Finally, a special Army board recently recommended that
fraudulent re-enlistment be made desertion.' This would tend to
indicate the importance of the area generally.
There are other reasons why these cases are useful for analysis.
These reasons will be discussed in conjunction with the analysis
itself. Suffice it to say here that the couxt deserves a Pulitzer Prize
for historical fiction-writing, and that any relation between the
court's decision and actual history is purely coincidental. It might
be added that the coincidence, at best, is tenuous indeed.
HI. PRE-WORLD WAR I HISTORY OF FRAUDULENT
ENLISTMENT DESERTION
The statute making the act of fraudulent enlistment by one pres-
ently in the army desertion came from -the British Articles of War
and has been part of the American Articles of War since 1776.'1
This statute is open to three possible interpretations: (1) that one
who re-enlists ipso facto becomes a deserter, regardless of his state
of mind as to permanent absence from his first unit, and that such
desertion is a separate and distinct offense from that which might
be committed by an absence without leave with intent to remain
away permanently committed at the same time; (2) that one who
re-enlists ipso facto becomes a deserter, also without regard to his
state of mind as to permanent absence from his first unit, but that
the statutory rule creates a rule of evidence which serves as a statu-
tory substitute for the normal elements of desertion, and hence
where the accused goes absent without leave with intent to remain
15. Judge Ferguson dissenting in United States v. LaRue, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
470, 478, 29 C.M.R. 286, 294 (1960).
16. United States v. Huff, 19 C.M.R. 603 (1955).
17. Fratcher, supra note 3, at 873-74.
18. Report to the Secretary of the Army, supra note 5, at 180.
19. DAVIS, MILrTARY LAW 432, 585, 606, 628 (3d ed. 1915).
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away from his first unit permanently, and also re-enlists, only one
desertion is committed; (3) re-enlistment is only evidence of in-
tent to remain away permanently. This author has already discussed
the historical origins of the statute as the anti-"bounty-jumping"
law,20 and it is sufficient to say that nothing in its early history
could lead one to doubt that it was meant as an offense separate
and distinct from straight desertion, and not requiring any intent
beyond the intent to enlist.
The earliest American textwriter to discuss the substantive mili-
tary law in detail was O'Brien. He notes, quite properly, that if a
soldier "should enlist, or offer to enlist, in a new service," this
serves as evidence of intent to desert under the general desertion
section. He then cautions: "There is, however, one case where the
court is precluded from entering into the question of intention,
the law having positively pronounced the enlisting in another
corps, without a lawful dischage from the first, to be an act of de-
sertion."'" O'Brien adds: "the very act of making the second en-
listment is made to constitute a desertion from the first."22 Thus,
O'Brien recognized that a second enlistment in any other service,
including the naval or marine service, or an attempt to enlist
therein, constitutes evidence of straight desertion. However, actual,
completed re-enlistment in the army is a statutory constructive de-
sertion, which does not require any intention. This difference con-
stantly recurs in consideration of the relation between straight de-
sertion and constructive desertion.
Reinforcing this view is O'Brien's discussion of the specifica-
tions under the two articles. Under the 20th Article of War of
1806,23 the general desertion Article, the model specification
reads: "That private A. B. of - regt., U.S. army, having been
duly enlisted at -, in the service of the U.S., * * * did desert
the same on or about the - day of from -. '24 The
model specification under the 22d Article of War, the constructive
desertion article, contains entirely different elements. It states:
"that the prisoner having been duly enlisted, etc., did again enlist
himself in -, at on or about the - day of , 18-, with-
out a regular discharge from the - regiment in which he last
served."25 Thus, where the accused has left his unit and re-en-
20. Avins, Historical Origins of Desertion Through Dual Enlistment,
77 L.Q. REV. -(1961).
21. O'BRIEN, AMERICAN MILITARY LAWS 96 (1846).
22. Id. at 98.
23. Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 359.
24. O'BRIEN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 304.
25. Ibid.
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listed in another, a specification might be laid under both the
20th and 22d Articles of War, with a charge for each.
Additional support for this view, that constructive desertion by
re-enlistment was separately chargeable from the desertion which
occurred when the accused left his unit, is found in the uniform
practice during the Civil War and thereafter. In a leading case,
Private James Burnell's case, the accused was charged as follows:
Charge I-Desertion.
Specification: [Accused] did absent himself without leave, from the
service of the United States, his said Company and Regiment then
and there being in constant expectation of a battle [from Dec. 29,
1862 to July 9, 1863].
Charge II-Violation of the 22d Article of War.
Specification: In this, that the said James Burnell, a private in Com-
pany "F', 10th Regiment Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, on or about
the 4th day of April, 1863, being a member of [said Company]
.. . having been duly enlisted in the service of the United States,
did enlist himself in Company "H", 34th Regiment, Kentucky Volunteer
Infantry.26
The accused was found guilty, and his sentence to be shot to death
was approved by the War Department. There are other cases of a
similar nature both in War Department orders and in field depart-
ment orders.27
Moreover, the opinions of General Holt, Lincoln's Judge Ad-
vocate General, are to the same effect. Thus, where a soldier went
absent without leave from his command and enlisted in another
regiment without a regular discharge, General Holt held:
The case appears to be precisely such a one as is contemplated by the
22nd Article of War. It is the enlistment in the second regiment without
a proper discharge from the first which constitutes the gist of the of-
fence and the crime is consumated by such enlistment whether the
26. G.O. 30, War Dept. (1864).
27. For example, in the case of Private William Cobb, G.O. 35, War
Dept. (1864), also a death sentence case, the accused, in addition to being
charged with straight desertion under the 20th Article of War, was also
charged as follows:
Charge Il-Violation of the 22nd Article of War.
Specification-In this, that he, the said Private William Cobb, Com-
pany 'E', 8th U.S. Infantry, did, on or about the 15th day of August,
1863, enlist himself as a substitute.
See also G.O. 83, Dept. of Washington (1864), where the accused was
charged with 17 violations of the 22d Article of War.
The practice of dual charges continued uninterrupted after the Civil War.
See, e.g., G.C.M.O. 63, War Dept. (1879), where the accused was charg-
ed with desertion from June 17, 1878 to October 4, 1879, and with, as a
separate charge, violation of Article of War 50, by enlisting on Septem-
ber 20, 1879 under another name. See also G.C.M.O. 35. War Dept.
(1878). And see the cases cited in note 43 infra.
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soldier has left his former regiment as a deserter or only as an absentee
without leave.2
In another opinion it was held that where a soldier, under sen-
tence of imprisonment for a term not longer than his term of en-
listment, escapes and is not arrested until his term of enlistment
expires, he may not be reincarcerated. However, if he re-enlists
in a new regiment without a formal discharge from the old, al-
though after expiration of the prior term of enlistment, he may be
tried, not for straight desertion, but for constructive desertion un-
der the 22d Article of War. 9 In still a third opinion, which is
significant because General Lieber was later to hold to the con-
trary, General Holt held that where a soldier left one regiment and
enlisted in another and subsequently lost his life in the line of
duty, no valid claim existed against the government for either ar-
rears of pay or bounty, in either service, on the grounds that the
pay and bounty in the first enlistment were forfeited by desertion,
and that the second enlistment was a fraud which rendered the
contract invalid.30
One final piece of evidence will complete the mosaic. In a
standard formbook published in 1877, there is a form for "Enlist-
ing in another Company without a regular discharge, in violation of
the 50th Article of War." The form reads: "In this, That - did
enlist himself in Company -, of - , without a regular dis-
charge from the - -[regiment, troop, or company] in which he
last served."'" This form is in addition to the form for desertion.
28. OPINION OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, R.
XI--450 (March 11, 1865) [hereinafter cited as Op. JAG], unpublished
manuscript in the Law Library, Office of the J.A.G., Dept. of the Army,
Washington (hereinafter abbreviated TJAGA Lib.).
See also DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL 8
(3d ed. 1868) [hereinafter cited as DIG. Ops. JAG]:
The gist of the offense specified in the first paragraph of the article
is the leaving one regiment, etc., and enlisting in another without a
due discharge from the former; and the offense is consumated whether
the soldier re-enlisting had, in leaving or staying away from his proper
regiment, etc., been guilty either of a technical desertion or of an ab-
sence without leave.
29. DIG. Ops. JAG 141 (3d ed. 1868). And see 14 Ops. ATT'Y GEN.
265, 267 (1873): "Article 22 makes provision for the punishment of a per-
son for reenlistment in a company or a regiment without a regular dis-
charge from another."
30. WILSON, DIGEST OF LAwS, RULINGS, AND DECISIONS ON DESERTION
51 No. 142 (1882). See also p. 16, No. 9. Note the distinction made in a
contemporary state statute between regular desertion and bounty-jumping.
Hanson v. South Scituate, 115 Mass. 336, 337 (1874), reprinting MASS.
STAT. ch. 230, § 3 (1865).
31. REGAN, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE RECORDER'S GUIDE 42 (1877). See
also CMO 23-1910 [pp. 7-13], reprinted in part in NAVAL DIG. 253
(1916), where it is stated
[Vol. 46:69
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Thus, it is clear that prior to 1880 the War Department consistently
interpreted constructive desertion by fraudulent enlistment to be a
separate and distinct offense, separately chargeable, and with dif-
ferent elements, from straight desertion.
Of course, during the early history of the Articles of War, the
fact that one could charge a fraudulent re-enlistee with both
straight desertion and constructive desertion was of little practical
significance. Since in eighteenth century England the penalty for
straight desertion was death,32 and since "it was made death for a
poor soldier, let him be ever so ill-used by his captain, to leave
the company or regiment he belonged to, and list in any other
company or regiment in his majesty's service, '33 it would present
practical difficulties to attempt to carry out both sentences. Like-
wise, since there was no authorization for a table of maximum
punishments in the United States Army before 1890,"4 the court-
martial could impose the maximum punishment for each specifica-
tion of desertion (death in wartime, life imprisonment otherwise),
and hence a double charge of desertion had no effect on the pun-
ishment. Such considerations make the above evidence regarding
the use of more than one charge all the more persuasive.
In 1879, there occurred an event which completely altered this
consistent interpretation of the constructive desertion statute by
the Judge Advocate General's office. This event did not occur in
the United States, but rather in Great Britain, and it consisted of the
passage of the Army Discipline and Regulation Act of 1879.11 A
century earlier, there existed serious controversy over the question
of how far acts of the Imperial Parliament bound the American
colonies, but by 1879 the problem may be deemed to have been
settled. Nevertheless, the failure of Congress to follow the British
enactment did not prevent the British law from making deep in-
roads into the thinking of the Judge Advocates General.
For a quarter of a century prior to 1879, the annual mutiny
acts contained provisions very similar to the American constructive
desertion statute.36 In 1879, the definition of desertion was re-
that the act of enlisting in the Army by a deserter who has not been
regularly discharged was and is an offense under the fiftieth Article
of War, and when a deserter re-enlists under the circumstances con-
templated therein he is charged with desertion and with violation of
the fiftieth article of war. The specification sometimes merely alleged
the facts of the re-enlistment .. . and E.ometimes alleged that the
offender did "fraudulently enlist," etc .....
32. See, e.g., Mutiny Act of 1717, 4 Geo. 1, ch. 4.
33. 15 HANsARD, PARLIAMENTARY IISTORY OF ENGLAND 253 (1754).
34. Act of Sept. 27, 1890, ch. 998, 26 Stat. 491.
35. 42 & 43 Vict., ch. 33.
36. Mutiny Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 4, § 19; Mutiny Act of
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stricted by eliminating constructive desertion, and inserting in lieu
thereof a fraudulent enlistment section.37 Notwithstanding some
rationalizations for the change that "a man cannot be deemed to
have permanently abandoned the service who rejoins it, however
unlawfully,"38 the reason for the elimination of constructive deser-
tion in British law was not doctrinal difficulty at all. Rather, it was
the feeling that fraudulent re-enlistment was more serious than de-
sertion,39 and the desire of the Secretary of State for War to pen-
alize this offense more heavily than had been done before.4" The
actual reason for the change, as told to the House of Commons,
was as follows:
[From the circumstance that the punishment of the crime of deser-
tion . . . was in our Service death, there had grown up a popular
feeling in favour of the deserter. But that crime was not included in
the present use of the word "desertion," which simply implied a fraudu-
lent breach of contract entered into with the Service; an act, in it-
self, essentially and notoriously disgraceful. He was, therefore, sure
that when this was clearly understood by the public there would not
remain a shadow of sympathy for a man who had committed this
crime, who would thenceforward be regarded as a thoroughly disgrace-
ful and fraudulent person.41
1878, 41 & 42 Vict., ch. 10, § 15. This provision had originally been
inserted in the Mutiny Act of 1781, 22 Geo. 3, ch. 4, § 2, and remained
until the Mutiny Act of 1811, 51 Geo. 3, ch. 8. Prior to 1781, the pro-
vision in the Mutiny Acts was not connected with desertion at all. See
Mutiny Act of 1688, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 4; Mutiny Act of 1780,
21 Geo. 3, ch. 8.
37. 42 & 43 Vict., ch. 33, § 13; 243 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 1915 (1879).
38. O'DowD, PRACTICAL HINTS TO COURTs-MARTIAL 53, 57 (1882).
39. See 247 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 737 (1879):
Take the case of a man under a non-commissioned officer, who
treated him with brutality and bullied him; such cases were by no
means uncommon, and many a man had been morally compelled to
desert by the pressure put upon him in that way. Was that to be
ranked with the crime of fraudulent enlistment, which had ever been,
and must always be, a much more voluntary act than desertion?
40. 247 PARL. DEB. (3d Ser.) 734 (1879), where the Secretary of State
for War declared:
He had already pointed out how great a blot upon the Army was
desertion; while fraudulent enlistment amounted to a regular trade;
and he quite admitted that the Government wanted to deal with those
crimes more severely than had been the case hitherto; and it was felt
necessary, while relieving the soldier of the consequences of some mi-
nor offenses, to hit him harder for crimes committed not only against
the State, but against his comrades. As the matter stood, a soldier
guilty of desertion from Her Majesty's Service, or of fraudulent enlist-
ment, ipso facto, would forfeit his service; he chose to break his
engagement and incur this penalty, and the State was right in consider-
ing him as entering into an engagement de novo.
41. 246 PA.L. DEB. (3d Ser.) 441-42 (1879).
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Thus, it is clear that the change was effected in British law in or-
der to stigmatize the re-enlistee as a fraud, undeserving of public
sympathy. The failure to understand the reasons for the change,
however, produced a gross distortion of its significance among
Americans.
The earliest opinion of the Judge Advocate General after the
enactment of the Army Discipline and Regulation Act of 1879
and which directed its attention to the British statute was written in
May, 1880.42 That opinion dealt with a case in which a soldier
deserted from an infantry regiment in June, 1878, and re-enlisted in
the General Service in September, 1879. A few days later he de-
serted from the General Service, and was subsequently arrested.
When brought to trial he was charged with and convicted of three
separate desertions, the third charge being the act of re-enlisting
in the General Service without a discharge from his prior unit, in
violation of the 50th Article of War. The Judge Advocate General
said:
This Article, in its first clause, does not create a specific offence, or
one distinct from the desertion made punishable in the 47th Article,
but declares in effect that a soldier who abandons his regiment shall
be deemed none the less a deserter although he may forthwith reenlist
in a new regiment. It does not render the act of reenlistment a deser-
tion, but simply makes the reenlistment, under the circumstances indi-
cated, prima facie evidence of a desertion from the previous enlist-
ment from which the soldier has not been discharged, or, more accur-
ately, evidence of an intent not to return 1:o the same. The object of
the provision, as it originally appears in the British Code, apparently
was to preclude the notion, that might otherwise have been entertain-
ed, that a soldier would be excused from repudiating or departing from
his original contract of enlistment, provided he presently renewed his
obligation in a different portion of the military force.
43
As authority, the opinion cites Samuel's Military Law44-- a book
used as indiscriminately then as Winthrop's text is used today. In-
deed, much of the opinion is copied, with only stylistic changes,
from Samuel. In a moment, we shall point up the significance of
this fact.
Six years later, Acting Judge Advocate General Lieber declared
as follows:
42. Op. JAG, R. XLII-642 (May 17, 1880) (TJAGA Lib.).
43. This opinion is reprinted in DIG. Ops. JAG 44-45 (1891). It must be
noted, however, that the practice of charging desertion under Article of
War 47 and adding an additional charge and specification under Article of
War 50 continued after Dunn's opinion. See, e.g., G.C.M.O. 6, War Dept.
(1881); G.C.M.O. 50, War Dept. (1881); G.C.M.O. 31, War Dept. (1882);
G.C.M.O. 2, War Dept. (1884); G.C.M.O. 7, War Dept. (1884).
44. Dia. Ops. JAG 24 n.2 (1880).
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On 24th Sept. last, in an endorsement in the case of Private William
E. Vanderworken, I expressed the opinion that the first clause of that
article does not create a distinct offense. This has been the opinion
heretofore held by this office, though not always by department com-
manders (see G.C.M.O. 72, Dept. Dakota, 1885). That it is the cor-
rect view will, I think, appear from the history of the article in the
British service from which it has come down to us, having been in-
corporated in our Military Code of 1776.
Referring to the article covering desertion, Samuel, in his "History
of the British Army," says: [Here Lieber quotes from Samuel.]
It is a perversion of language to call an enlistment into the service
a desertion from it. The enlistment of a soldier already in the service
into another regiment or other military organization, without hav-
ing been previously and lawfully discharged, may, under certain cir-
cumstances be a very grave offense, but it is not desertion, and he
cannot, therefore, for such offense, be reputed a deserter. Hence in
the present British Army Act, it is classed as "fraudulent enlistment"
and punished as such. We retain the article in its original form causing
occasional conflicts of opinion and action. 45
General Lieber also quotes Samuel as the authoritative interpreter
of the article in question. The result is a most egregious blunder.
A close reading of the cited pages of Samuel's text shows that
he was discussing the second clause of the then current Mutiny
Act.4" But this provision which Samuel was discussing had noth-
ing whatsoever to do with the provision of the Article of War
which was copied into the American code from the British. The
provisions involved are wholly different in every respect."' The re-
45. Op. JAG 10-4 (May, 1886) (TJAGA Lib.). This opinion is men-
tioned, although not digested, in DIG. OPs. JAG 30 (1901). Subsequent to
General Lieber's opinion, it became the practice to charge the re-enlistee with
desertion under Article of War 47 and with a second charge under Article of
War 62 (general article) alleging the fraudulent enlistment. See G.C.M.O.
20, War Dept. (1887); G.C.M.O. 27, War Dept. (1887). This practice was
made service-wide in G.O. 57, A.G.O., War Dept. (1892). See note 68
infra.
46. SAMUEL, MILITARY LAW 330-31 (1816).
47. The provision which Samuel was discussing had been first enacted
only four years before in the Mutiny Act of 1812, 52 Geo. 3, ch. 22 and
reads:
No non-commissioned officer or soldier who shall desert His Majesty's
service, shall be exempt from the pains and penalties imposed by this
Act for such offense by again inlisting into His Majesty's service; but
any such soldier shall, notwithstanding such subsequent inlistment, be
deemed to have deserted His Majesty's service, and shall in like man-
ner suffer death, or such other punishment as by a court-martial
shall be awarded.
The British article of war from which the American article was copied
verbatim is § 6, Art. III of the British Articles of War of 1774, and states:
No Non-commissioned Officer or Soldier shall inlist himself in any
other Regiment, Troop, or Company without a regular Discharge
from the Regiment, Troop, or Company, in which he has last served,
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suit of the above two opinions, therefore, is to distort entirely the
meaning of the American statute by using Samuel's discussion of a
wholly unrelated provision of the Mutiny Act as the key to the in-
terpretation of an Article of War different in all respects from the
Mutiny Act clause.
The result of the above attempts to fit a British interpretation
of a statute to an American statute of an entirely different char-
acter was to throw the application of an Article of War, previously
uniform and rational, into utter chaos. When there was added to
this chaos the hostility displayed, by the Judge Advocate General's
office, because of the new British rule, toward the article in ques-
tion, as illustrated by General Lieber's opinion, and the conse-
quent desire to confine it to as few cases as possible, a sort of hy-
draulic pressure was exerted on the article which squeezed it into
the narrowest possible compass.
However, a counter-pressure was exerted from the field. This
movement was sustained first, by the importance of the 50th Ar-
ticle in punishing soldiers who repeatedly deserted and re-enlisted,
and second, by the knowledge, some first-hand, some handed down,
that by immemorial custom the 50th Article had been interpreted
as a separate constructive desertion provision, violation of which
was chargeable in addition to regular desertion. These currents
and cross-currents of opinion spawned a half-century of confusion
in the Judge Advocate General's Corps on the meaning of the ar-
ticle.
For example, as noted previously, General Holt had held the
fraudulent re-enlistment void, and one which therefore conferred
no rights on the re-enlistee.48 But General Lieber, in a later opin-
ion, held that time served under the new enlistment was creditable
service toward retirement, on the theory that "the man who was a
deserter before he enlisted the last time does not again commit the
crime of desertion by enlisting, and there is no law making such
an enlistment void." However, he also held that the re-enlistment
was made "conclusive proof" of desertion by the 50th Article,49
on the Penalty of being reputed as a Deserter, and suffering accord-
ingly ....
This provision is reprinted in DAvis, MILITRY LAW 585 (3d ed. 1915).
It might be noted that the clause with which Samuel dealt had replaced
a section of the Mutiny Act similar to the Article of War. See Mutiny
Act of 1781, 22 Geo. 3, ch. 4, § 2. This serves to emphasize the difference
between the provisions and the inapplicability of Samuel's commentary.
48. WILSON, op. cit. supra note 30.
49. Letter 355, Sept. 18, 1894 (TJAGA Lib.). This opinion is referred
to, but not digested, in DIG. Ops. JAG 30 (1901). In his opinion, General
Lieber states:
It is clear from the language of the brief that the opinion that the
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thus differing from Judge Advocate General Dunn's opinion of
1880, set forth above, 0 that such re-enlistment was only prima
facie evidence of intent to abandon the prior enlistment.
Later, General Davis followed the previous reliance on Samuel
for interpretation of the statute.51 Moreover, he reverted to Gen-
eral Dunn's position. Thus, he declared that a soldier who re-en-
listed without a discharge "by statute . . . became prima facie a
deserter" because the re-enlistment without discharge "under the
50th Article of War is proof of the intent" to abandon the prior
organization permanently.52
Of course, the effect of General Davis' construction is to read
Article of War 50 out of the Code. General Davis had himself held
that a soldier who goes absent without leave with intent to report
at a post other than his own was guilty of desertion.53 This hold-
said service is not legal service is based on the mistaken understand-
ing that the 50th Article of War makes the enlistment of deserters
itself desertion. But this is a mistake. That article declares that a man
belonging to the army, etc., who enlists while belonging to it shall be
considered a deserter, i.e., this enlistment shall be conclusive proof that
he has deserted from his former enlistment, and it shall not be claimed
that because he is yet in the service he has not deserted from it.
50. WiLsoN, op. cit. supra note 30.
51. For example, in Op. C. 902 (Jan. 18, 1895) (TJAGA Lib.), noted
but not digested in DIG. Ops. JAG 30 (1901), and approved by General
Lieber, General Davis declared:
The article is properly to be regarded as having been declaratory of
existing law, and to have been intended to remove a doubt which ex-
isted (when it was enacted in England) whether a soldier who left one
command, and did not remain absent from the service, but enlisted in
another command could be regarded as having the same status as to
his first enlistment as the man who remained absent. It was to re-
move a doubt. The law already was that such a second enlistment did
not absolve the soldier from the obligations of the first. Samuel in his
work on Military Law says: [Here quoting Samuel]
The enactment in question is therefore not to be regarded as estab-
lishing a new principle of law, but as being in aid of an existing one.
It was already unlawful to abandon one contract of enlistment and en-
ter into another. And under this principle it could make no differ-
ence whether the deserter enlisted again in the regiment from which
he deserted or another. Either was a violation of his first obligation.
Likewise, in Op. C. 23644 (July 23, 1908) (TJAGA Lib.), General
Davis declared:
The 50th Article of War was taken from the English Articles of
War and the purpose of its adoption was to prevent enlisted men
from separating themselves from one branch or regiment of the serv-
ice, enlisting in another branch or regiment of the service and when
charged with desertion setting up a want of intent to desert as indi-
cated by a return to the service. This had frequently been done and
this Article was adopted so as to establish an intent to desert upon a
subsequent enlistment.
52. Op. C. 23644 (July 23, 1908) (TJAGA Lib.).
53. Op. C. 24722 (April 5, 1909) (TJAGA Lib.).
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ing is fully in accord with well-accepted law.5" Accordingly, the
act of re-enlistment at the new post would, under General Davis'
interpretation, add nothing because reporting at the new post and
concealment of status would be evidence of intent to abandon the
old post regardless of whether the soldier re-enlisted.
In addition, without benefit of a provision such as Article 50,
the Navy had held that fraudulent re-enlistment, either in the
naval service or in the army, was evidence of intent to desert from
the previous contract of enlistment.55 This also shows that Davis'
interpretation would render the statute superfluous.
The real problem in assaying the effect of the special statute lies
in the failure to distinguish between the law without the statute
and the added effect of the provision. Unauthorized absence with
intent to abandon the prior contract of enlistment constitutes
straight desertion. Such intent is evidenced not only by enlistment
in another army unit, but also by attachment to another unit with-
out re-enlisting, if done in a clandestine manner, or by enlistment
in the naval service, or by numerous other acts. Hence, singling
out enlistment in another army unit only is inexplicable, unless the
statute is designed to have a special effect. This effect can only
be that the elements mentioned in the provision itself are enough
to constitute the offense. The failure to distinguish between the
natural propensity of the elements of constructive desertion to es-
tablish straight desertion, and the added. special effect of the con-
structive desertion statute, is a dominant flaw in the opinions
which so often have misinterpreted the law.
Three textwriters of the period remain to be examined. Davis
simply repeats his own opinions and those of General Dunn, rely-
ing heavily on Samuel.56 Dudley does likewise.5" Winthrop, how-
ever, does not. In the first edition, published in 1886, before Lieb-
er's opinion previously mentioned, Winthrop declares:
[Article 50] is to be construed, however, not as creating an offence
distinct from the desertion made punishable by Art. 47, but as indicat-
ing a specific form of such offence, or rather as declaring that the
act of reenlisting under the circumstances described shall constitute
proof of desertion on the part of the soldier.-'s
54. See, e.g., BULL. 36, War Dept. 13 (1915); MANUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1916 409; AviNs, THE LAW OF AWOL 134 (1957).
55. Naval Courts and Boards, 56-57 (1937); Forms of Procedure for
Courts and Boards in the Navy and Marine Corps 98 (1910); NAVAL DIG.
168 (1916); CMO 23-1910 [p. 8].
56. DAvis, MILITARY LAW 432 (2d ed. 1911).
57. DUDLEY, MILITARY LAW 380 (1907).
58. 1 WINTnRoP, MILITARY LAw 933 (1886).
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To support this proposition, Winthrop cites Dum's opinion, as
digested in his 1880 digest5 9 and several department court-mar-
tial orders.6" He then proceeds to add a sentence on the supposed
object of the provision, copied from Samuel and citing him as
authority." Winthrop, in his forms of charges in the appendix,
however, has a form under Article of War 50 which simply al-
leges in the model specification that the accused, a private in one
regiment, "did, without having been regularly discharged from
said company and regiment, enlist himself in" another regi-
ment.
62
That Winthrop did not agree with the Dunn-Davis position that
Article of War 50 was merely evidence of intent, but in fact be-
lieved that this Article created a form of constructive desertion, so
that proof of the elements of the statute was proof of the whole of
the crime, is adequately illustrated not only by the above-quot-
ed language but by a comparison of his second edition with the
first edition. Winthrop added to the second edition a section on
proof and defense in which he states:
The previous voluntary enlistment or service, and the absence of any
discharge therefrom, together with the deliberate enlistment in the
"other" regiment or company, being shown by the evidence of the
proper commanding officer, adjutant, recruiting officer, etc., the act
of desertion defined in the Article is proved, and there can be no
valid defence. 63
This is in sharp contrast to his extensive discussion of defenses
in respect to regular desertion.64 Second, Winthrop dropped the
citation to General Dunn's opinion in the footnote previously men-
tioned, although a citation to another opinion of General Holt re-
mains in the footnote immediately preceding it.65 Thirdly, he
has retained, in unaltered form, the specimen charge for violation
of Article of War 50.66 Finally, and unquestionably the most re-
markable of all, Winthrop has added a paragraph advising his
59. Supra note 44.
60. WINTHROP, op. cit. supra note 58, at 933 n.3.
61. Id. at 933-34, n.1.
62. 2 WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW 334 (1886).
63. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 652-53 (Reprint 2d
ed. 1920).
64. Id. at 642-43.
65. Id. at 652, nn. 28 & 29.
66. Id. at 1017. A Coast Guard board of review noticed the charge in
United States v. Huff, 19 C.M.R. 603, 607 (1955). Davis, it might be not-
ed, has no specimen charge for desertion under the 50th Article, although
he has two for other forms of violation of the 47th Article. DAVIs, op. cit.
supra iote 56, at 663.
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readers to charge the desertion under the 50th Article of War,6"
notwithstanding the fact that three years before, the Adjutant-Gen-
eral's office had issued a most explicit order requiring the deser-
tion to be charged under the 47th Article, the general desertion
article.68
From all of the above, it could hardly be clearer that while
Winthrop did not believe that there should be two charges of de-
sertion laid in a case of fraudulent re-enlistment, he did believe
that proof of the re-enlistment is proof of the whole of the offense
of desertion, and that the crime should be laid under the 50th
Article of War. Thus, Winthrop in effect takes the same position
as General Lieber, namely, that the 50th Article of War creates a
species of constructive desertion.
Of course, Winthrop's positive statement that there is no de-
fense once the re-enlistment is proven is not, strictly speaking,
correct. For example, a re-enlistment entered into because of nec-
essity would be a good defense.6 9 Likewise, duress could also be
shown as a defense."0 Further a mistake of fact of authority-
67. Id. at 652. It would appear, at least, that Op. C. 21422 (April 23,
1907) (TJAGA Lib.) is in accord with this view.
68. G.O. 57, A.G.O., War Dept. (1892). This order is noted in DAVIS,
op. cit. supra note 56, at 662 n.2, 678 n.2; and in MAIUAL FOR COURTS-
MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1898, at 104.
69. See Hersey and Avins, Compulsion as a Defense to Criminal Prose-
cution, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 293 (1958), which contains the opinion of
Judge Advocate General Holt that Union prisoners who enlisted in Con-
federate ranks during the Civil War to avoid death were not to be con-
sidered as deserters. We are told in WILSON, op. cit. supra note 30, at 26,
that 3,416 Union soldiers enlisted in the Confederate army during the Civil
War while prisoners of war. In one such case, the Judge Advocate General
declared:
In the claim of a soldier for commutation of rations while prisoner
of war, and who, while in such condition enlisted in the rebel army in
order to facilitate his escape, did escape, and rejoined his proper
regiment, held, that the charge of desertion involved in his enlist-
ment with the enemy should be removed, on the ground that he proved
his motive by accomplishing it. Id. at 26, No. 42.
70. PRATr, MILITARY LAw 127 (1884) recounts a case where an English
corporal serving in Canada was virtually kidnapped and made to serve as a
Union soldier during the Civil War, and wa:s unable to return to his regi-
ment until after the close of the war. In the Report of the Select Com-
mittee, House of Commons, on the Army and Air Force Act (1954),
Minutes of Evidence, 278, Assistant Judge Advocate General C. M. Cahn
described the following case:
a soldier came over here from Erie and enlisted. During his leave
he went back to Erie and got picked up by the Erie Army and was
compelled to serve in the Erie Army and possibly might be sentenced
to detention as a deserter from the Erie Army. He was not guilty of
absence without leave.
But compare the opinion in AviNs, op. cit. supra note 54, at 149-50, and
the commentary thereon.
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which as applied to this statute would be a good motive outside
of one of the evils sought to be guarded against by the law-
would serve as a defense.7 Mistake of fact by the accused would
also be a defense.72 But all of these defenses go to the elements
of the special statutory crime. None of them concern whether the
accused intended to return to his first enlistment. This, under the
Lieber-Winthrop view, would be irrelevant.
Ten years after Winthrop wrote the second edition of his book,
Davis made a strained and unpersuasive attempt to reconcile the
two positions, the sole effect of which is really to highlight the
differences.73 In reality, Winthrop and Davis change places as
nimbly as a quadrille on the issue of whether the 49th and 50th
Articles of War, the two special desertion articles, constitute mere-
ly proof of intent or constitute constructive desertion. Davis states
that the 49th Article of War, punishing officer-resignation deser-
tion, creates a constructive desertion,74 while Winthrop says it is
merely declaratory of existing law.75 Winthrop's position as to the
50th Article is the reverse,76 and so is that of Davis.7  How-
ever, running through both of those opinions is the same funda-
71. Id. at 188-206. A soldier who, for example, re-enlisted as part of a
plan to uncover and expose treasonous superior officers, or a dangerous
spy ring, would undoubtedly not be considered a deserter. See, in accord
with this, CMO 30-1910 [pp. 4-5], reprinted in NAvAL Di. 252 (1916),
where it was held that an accused in the Navy who re-enlisted as the only
means available to return to his post was not a deserter.
72. Id. at 183-87. In Dio. Ops. JAG 30 (1901), it was held that where
a soldier was notified that he had been discharged from a previous enlist-
ment, and believed this, he was not guilty of desertion for enlisting in a
new regiment, although through mistake or accident the discharge certifi-
cate was not issued.
73. Op. C. 18801 (Nov. 2, 1905) (TJAGA Lib.). General Davis says.
in part:
The soldier who deserts and afterwards re-enlists commits two of-
fenses-desertion and fraudulent enlistment, both of which he is prop-
erly triable by court-martial for. The fact of reenlistment, while ab-
sent in desertion, constitutes proof of the intent not to return to the
organization from which he deserted which is an essential ingredient
of the offense of desertion. The only difference between Winthrop
and the Digest, in this regard, is that the former holds such reenlist-
ment to be proof of desertion; and the Digest declares it to be prima
facie evidence of desertion. These statements do not differ in any
material respect; they describe, in different words, the probative force
of an act committed by the accused which is calculated to throw light
upon the question of criminal intent in a particular act of desertion.
74. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 56, at 431. This author has already dem-
onstrated that the 49th Article also creates a constructive desertion. See
Avins, Right of Military Officers to Resign-A Civil War Footnote (un-
published manuscript in University of Chicago Law Library).
75. WNTHROP, op. cit. supra note 63, at 652.
76. Ibid.
77. DAvis, op. cit. supra note 56, at 432.
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mental vice, a defect which has permeated and colored the entire
view of the statute since 1880. That vice is the basic reliance on
Samuel's discussion of an entirely different British provision. It is
through these distorted glasses that writers of that period have
viewed the statute. Accordingly, all of the opinions of the half-
dozen Judge Advocates General on this statute written between
1880 and 1908, and the discussion of the three textwriters, Win-
throp, Davis and Dudley, as to its derivation, intent and meaning,
are wholly worthless.
In 1908, the War Department finally decided to end this con-
fusion in the Judge Advocate General's office. By service-wide or-
der, it required that when charges were preferred against a soldier
who left one unit and enlisted in another without a discharge, one
specification would be laid under the 47th Article of War for
straight desertion, and a second specification would be laid under
the same article. The latter specification would allege that the ac-
cused "did desert . . . by enlisting" in the new unit "without a
regular discharge" from his old unit. A third specification for
fraudulent enlistment would be laid under the 62d (general) Ar-
ticle."' The situation remained thus until Judge Advocate General
Enoch H. Crowder assumed office and commenced work on the
World War I revision of the American military law.
When we turn to find out what the Court of Military Appeals
has to say about all of this, we find, amazingly enough, that it says
nothing at all. All it does is cite a passage noted above from Win-
throp's second edition, and even at that fails to cite the further
sentence that proof of enlistment proves the offense and that there
is no defense. 9 To heighten the fantasy, it cites Winthrop in
support of the Dunn-Davis position.
Here we pause to note the first grave defect in the performance
of the Court of Military Appeals-its utter lack of the most ele-
mentary familiarity with sources of military law. This void is so
vast that an attorney would not believe it unless he knew it to
be the truth. Yet it is in fact the case. The court is not only ig-
noring the most fundamental sources of military law in its own
78. Cir. 76, War Dept. (1908). These new provisions are noted in MAN-
UAL FOR COURTs-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1908, 17, 136; and in MANUAL FOR
COURTs-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1910, 17, 138. The last edition of
Dudley's work, while retaining the same text, has a footnote reference to
this new order. See DUDLEY, MiLrrARY LAw 380, n.1 (3d ed. 1912). In-
terestingly enough, Davis' last edition contains no reference to it. See
DAVIs, MILrrARY LAW 432 (3d ed. 1915). In Op. C. 23644 (July 23,
1908) (TJAGA Lib.), it was held that War Dept. Circular 76 required a
a second specification, but not a second charge.
79. United States v. Johnson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 302, 17 C.M.R. 297,
302 (1954).
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opinions, but what is far graver, under its constant example, young
military lawyers are "growing up" in the service ignorant of the
basic source material of military law. Indeed, some of them ap-
parently think it is a virtue to know so little."
In the ten years that the Court of Military Appeals has been in
operation, this author cannot remember the court citing any
source for authority before 1916 except Winthrop. To the court,
Winthrop seems to be the beginning and end of all legal research
before World War I; if it wasn't in Winthrop, it did not exist.
Winthrop seems to have become an excuse for the court not to do
its own independent work. He has been turned into a panacea
which cures all legal problems.
This author would be the last to dispute the fact that Winthrop's
text is very useful, and deserves the high reputation it has attain-
ed."1 Nor will a quarrel be made with General Green's statement
that the book will never become obsolete. 2 But it does not follow
that the book may be used without proper discrimination. Like
any text, some errors creep in, only one of which is noted here. 3
Careful students of military law, considering the then available
material, have noticed that in a number of areas the book is not
comprehensive. For example, in his section on desertion Win-
throp has not noted the British development in regard to short de-
sertion. 4 This is to be expected. An author devotes most of his
attention to the problems which are important in his day, and
tends to slight other areas. He cannot be expected to see ahead and
predict what will be important three-quarters of a century later.
Finally, like all other authors, this one not excepted, Winthrop has
particular views and special prejudices which color his argument
and presentation and sometimes even his use of materials.8 5 This
must also be taken into consideration.
80. Cf. Meagher, Book Review, 5 MILITRY L. REv. 129, 130-31(1959).
81. Prugh, Colonel William Winthrop: The Tradition of the Military Law-
yer, 42 A.B.A.J. 126 (1956).
82. Green, Book Review, 56 MicH. L. REv. 833, 835 (1958).
83. Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice
1, 72 HAv. L. REv. 1, 18 n.131 (1958).
84. Compare WINThROP, op. cit. supra note 63 at 636, 641, with Avins,
A History of Short Desertion, 13 MILrr'.y L. REv. 143 (1961).
85. For one example, see WnsrImop, op. cit. supra note 63, at 735,
wherein he declares that the re-enlistment of a soldier without a prior dis-
charge should not be charged as fraudulent enlistment. Winthrop fails to
mention G.O. 57, A.G.O., War Dept. (1892), which requires that in all
such cases, in addition to the charge of desertion, the accused should be
charged with fraudulent enlistment, in violation of the 62d (general) Article.
See MANUAL FOR COURTs-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1898, 104. Judge Ferguson's
indiscriminate use of Winthrop in United States v. LaRue, 11 U.S.C.M.A.
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The Court of Military Appeals, however, has never done this,
and the Johnson case is an excellent illustration. Instead of going
to original sources, the court uses Winthrop, who relies on opin-
ions of the Judge Advocate General, who in turn rely on Samuel.
Unfortunately, the latter was discussing a provision of the Mutiny
Act entirely different from that in the Articles of War. Thus, the
court swallows whole a fourth-hand source and, notwithstanding
the gross and palpable error which stood out like a neon sign, it
makes not the slightest pretense at independent analysis.
When the Court of Military Appeals stops using Winthrop as a
crutch its opinions will begin to reflect the actual background of
military law instead of reading like a cross between Ivanhoe and
The Red Badge of Courage. Until then, its opinions will continue
to be substandard.
IH. CROWDER'S CHANGES DURING WORLD WAR I
On February 15, 1911, Brig. General Enoch H. Crowder be-
came Judge Advocate General of the Army. Crowder was a strict
disciplinarian, a careful lawyer and a precise draftsman. These per-
sonal traits play no small part in the legislative history of the stat-
ute.
Revision of the Articles of War had long been a pet project
with Crowder. As early as 1903, when he was Assistant Judge
Advocate General, Crowder proposed a draft of new articles, in
which Articles 47 and 49 (straight desertion and officer-resigna-
tion desertion) as well as Article 50, remained unaltered as new
Articles 30, 31, and 34, respectively. 6 Shortly thereafter, how-
ever, he changed Article 50, renumbered as Article 33, to read:
Any soldier who shall quit the organization or corps to which he prop-
erly belongs and enlist himself or join and be voluntarily enlisted or
mustered into any other organization or corps of the Army (or militia
when in service of the United States) or into the Navy or Marine
Corps of the United States, without having first received a regular
discharge, shall be deemed to have fraudulently enlisted therein and
to be a deserter from the organization or corps to which he properly
belongs.8 7
470, 477-78, 29 C.M.R. 286, 293-94 (1960), has again led into error on
this issue.
86. CROWDER, PRINT Op REVISED ARTICLES OF WAR-PROPOSED REVI-
SION OF 1903 at 9 (TJAGA Lib.).
87. CROWDER, PRINT OF REVISED ARTICLES OF WAR-PROPOSED REVI-
SION OF 1903-04, 10 (1904) (TJAGA Lib.). It is worthy of note that the
revised article still appears under a section labeled Desertion and Fraudu-
lent Enlistment.
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The reason for the change from the prior statute is explained as
follows:
The scope of this article has been broadened so as to apply to enlist-
ments in the militia when in active service of the United States and in
the Navy and Marine Corps, and the offense is declared to be fraudu-
lent enlistment as well as establishing desertion. . . As the word
soldier is defined to include non-commissioned officers (Article 1), the
latter term is omitted.88
While the project met with favor from the General Staff,"9 the
revised articles were not enacted, and nothing more seems to have
been accomplished until Crowder became Judge Advocate Gener-
al.
Early in 1912, Crowder revived his revision of the Articles
of War and, with the approval of the Secretary of War, the new
code was introduced in Congress.9" By this time, Article of War
50 had been renumbered as Article 29, and placed under a sec-
tion labeled "Courts-Martial" and a subsection labeled "proced-
ure."'' The reason for this was that, in Crowder's opinion, the
article constituted a "rule of evidence" which declared that "the
88. Ibid. General Davis stated that General Crowder's proposed revi-
sion of Article 50 contemplates no change except to add the language of
the Act of July 27, 1892, ch. 272, 27 Stat. 278, in respect to fraudulent en-
listment. Memorandum by the Judge Advocate General on Modification
of the Verbiage of the Articles of War 11 (1904) (TJAGA Lib.).
89. See Memorandum of Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell, Chief of Staff,
and a Board of Officers, dated February 20, 1904 (TJAGA Lib.), recom-
mending the revision. In a letter from Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis to Col.
Crowder, Feb. 5, 1904 (TJAGA Lib.), the former recommended that the
proposed revised article be changed to read: "Any soldier who quits the or-
ganization or corps to which he properly belongs and procures enlistment
into any other organization or corps of the army . ...
90. See typed draft of Proposed Articles of War by the Judge Ad-
vocate General, dated April 12, 1912, with letter from Crowder to the
Secretary of War bearing the same date, requesting submission of the code
to Congress. See also letters of Sec. of War Henry L. Stimson, enclosing
copies of the draft, dated April 19, 1912, to Congressman James Hay,
Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee, and to Senator Henry
A. Du Pont, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, approv-
ing the draft. (TJAGA Lib.). Senator Du Pont introduced the code as S.
6550 on April 25, 1912, 48 CONG. REc. 5316 (1912), while Congressman
Hay introduced it as H.R. 23628 on April 22, 1912. 48 CONG. REc. 5162
(1912).
91. The new article reads:
Enlistment without discharge. Any soldier who quits the organiza-
tion to which he properly belongs and, without having first received
a regular discharge from such organization, enlists in or joins any oth-
er organization of the Army, or militia when in the service of the
United States, or the Navy or Marine Corps of the United States,
shall be deemed to have deserted from the former and to have fraud-
ulently enlisted in the latter organization.
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act of re-enlisting shall constitute a proof of desertion."92 Crowd-
er told the House Military Affairs Committee that the Article was
"administrative,""3 and that punitive effect was to be given to the
prohibition by the general desertion section."
The 1912 revision never got past the hearing stage. Two years
later, however, the Senate passed the code, but it died in the
House of Representatives.95 The only change made in Article 30,
the re-enlistment-desertion section, was the provision that the re-
enlistee "shall be deemed to have deserted the service of the United
States and to have fraudulently enlisted," rather than the prior
provision that he would be deemed to have deserted from his
prior organization and to have enlisted fraudulently in the new
organization.96 Thus, the concept of constructive desertion was
clearly introduced iito the new article.
92. A Comparison of the Proposed New Articles of War (H.R. 23628)
With the Present Articles of War and Other Related Statutes 22 (1912). In
Crowder's own copy, in TJAGA Lib., the following explanation is type-
written opposite the printed article:
Art. 29. The first sentence of Article 50 of the existing code, which
this article substitutes, is according to accepted construction a rule of
evidence. In effect it declares that the act of reenlisting shall con-
stitute a proof of desertion from the old organization to which the
solider reenlisting belonged. It did not create an offense distinct from
desertion made punishable by the 47th Article, and was not therefore
punitive in character.
93. Hearings on H.R. 23628, Revision of the Articles of War, Before the
House Committee on Military Affairs, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1912):
Article 29, like article 28, is substantially a rule of evidence and sub-
stitutes that part of existing article 50 which is in its character admin-
istrative. The punitive part of said article 50 is transferred to the pe-
nal provisions of this revision, viz., to article 59 of the revision. The
underscored language of new article 29 shows that the existing law
has been considerably broadened. The existing law took cognizance of
abandonments of one organization of the Army and enlistment in an-
other, while the new article covers not only the abandonment of an
organization of the Army, but engaging for service in any other
branch of the Army, or militia when in the service of the United
States, or the Navy or Marine Corps of the United States, and lays
down the rule that the offender shall be deemed to have fraudulently
enlisted in the new organization in which lie fraudulently enlists. There
can be no difference of opinion, I think, about the necessity of expand-
ing the article in this regard.
94. "Article 59 is simply a repetition of so much of existing article 50
as was punitive in character. The administrative part of the latter article
has been placed elsewhere." Id. at 53-54.
95. S. 1032, introduced April 15, 1913, referred to and reported by the
Senate Committee on Military Affairs (S. REP. No. 229) on February 6,
1914, debated, and passed February 9, 1914. 51 CONG. REc. 3022, 3211-
13 (1914). The bill was re-introduced as H.R. 7291 on August 5, 1913,
and referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs on February 12,
1914, but no further action was taken. 51 CONG. REc. 3415 (1914).
96. Revision of the Articles of War, S. 1032, S. Rm,. No. 229, 63d
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Finally in 1916, the revision of the Articles of War was again
introduced and passed by the Senate, and when favorable House
action was not forthcoming, it was tacked on to the Army Ap-
propriations Bill and passed as an amendment thereto. 7 Crowd-
er's difficulty in securing even the limited revision was reflected
in a letter wherein he wrote: "What I do know for certain is that,
at the time I secured the 1916 revision, I couldn't have gone an-
other step further than I did without imperiling the whole revi-
sion.""
In some material prepared for the Senate Committee, Crowd-
er again characterized the article as a "rule of evidence."99 He
also told the committee:
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1914). See note 91 supra. Project for the Revision of
the Articles of War-Report of a Committee on the Proposed Revision of
the Articles of War, March 10, 1915 (TJAGA Lib.) p. 17, pursuant to the
instructions of the Chief of Staff, contains a draft of proposed Article 30
(re-enlistment desertion) in S. 1032, which reads, in part: "shall be deemed
to have deserted the former and to have fraudulently enlisted in the latter
organization." The words "former" and "in the latter organization" are
crossed out in handwriting, and in place of "former" the words "service of
the United States" are added. This report also recommended that the
words "or joins" contained in the phrase "enlists in or joins any other or-
ganization" be omitted "because they are considered unnecessary." Ibid.
97. The amended articles were introduced as S. 3191 by Senator Cham-
berlain on January 6, 1916, referred to the Senate Military Affairs Com-
mittee and favorably reported on February 11, 1916, (S. REP. No. 130,
64th Cong., 1st Sess.), and passed on March 9, 1916. On July 24, 1916, S.
3191 was added to H.R. 16460, the Army Appropriations Bill, which
passed both houses. After the President vetoed the bill because it excluded
retired officers from military jurisdiction, both houses re-passed it without
this objectionable feature. It became law on August 29, 1916. 53 CONG.
REc. 572, 2396, 3828-30, 3979, 11384-92, 11435-63, 11474, 12384-
92, 12395, 12400, 12844-45, 12991-93, 13036-42, 13203-08; 39 Stat.
650.
98. Letter from Major General Enoch H. Crowder to Colonel William
Rand, April 30, 1919, on file in the Crowder Papers, Western Historical
Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri Library, Columbia, Mo.
(hereinafter referred to as Crowder Papers).
99. Comparative Print, Showing S. 3191 with Present Articles of War,
printed for use of Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1916). The discussion under the new Article 29 declares:
Article 29 substitutes present article 50. The latter article is, accord-
ing to accepted construction, nothing more than a rule of evidence. In
effect it declares that the act of reenlistment shall constitute proof of
desertion from the old organization to which the soldier reenlisting be-
longed. It does not create a substantive offense distinct from the of-
fense of desertion made punishable in existing article 47 (article 58 of
the revision), and should therefore not be drawn so as to appear to
be punitive in character. The subject matter of the second sentence of
existing article 50 has been carried to article 60 of the revision, where
it properly belongs.
This explanation is taken from a project of revision of the articles of
war, photostatic copy of the typed manuscript, pp. 6-7 (1916) (TJAGA
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The effect of the new article is to establish his character as a de-
serter so that he can be handled under the punitive articles dealing
with desertion; so I have transferred this last article to another part
of the code.
This article is very useful. It occasionally happens that a man dis-
likes his organization, and he quits in a moment of petulance and
goes to another distant post and enlists there; and he can repeat that
performance indefinitely, without much consequence to himself unless
the law fixes upon his act of leaving the organization to which he regu-
larly belongs, and enlisting in another organization at another place,
the character of desertion. The words "in a foreign army" are inserted
to reach the case of reservists who have left the United States and en-
listed in one or another of the belligerent armies. 100
The above statements clearly show that Crowder intended the
revised article to be a statutory rule of evidence by which the
whole of the offense would be proved. It thus created a form of
constructive desertion. Crowder thereby was adopting the Lieber-
Winthrop position rather than the Dunn-Davis position. All of
the other available evidence points to the same conclusion.
Of such evidence, the Manual for Courts-Martial is the most
significant. The 1916 Manual contains three provisions dealing
with re-enlistment desertion. First, in respect to pleading, in cases
where an undischarged soldier re-enlists, the Manual requires that
only the one specification of desertion be preferred.' The em-
phasis, by way of italics and reference to the 1908 War Depart-
ment circular previously discussed, makes it clear that Crowder in-
tended to change the 8-year-old rule. The Manual notes that the
Article "constitutes a rule of evidence and is not a punitive arti-
cle."' 02
Second, after a lengthy discussion of evidence of intent to re-
main away permanently, 1 3 the Manual states that "it shall be
sufficient proof of desertion" that an undischarged soldier has re-
Lib.). On the manuscript copy, in General Crowder's handwriting, is the
following: "Gen. Tunston recommended placing Art. 28 among articles
dealing with miscellaneous crimes and offenses. So as to Art. 29."
100. Hearings on S. 3191, Revision of the Articles of War, Before the
Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1916).
Crowder also declared:
The existing article 50 seems to have contemplated a man leaving his
organization in the Regular Army to enlist in another organization in
the Regular Army. It consists of two parts, one of which is a rule of
evidence, and the other punitive. I have preserved only the first part
of article 50 in new article 29, and have broadened its application to
include the militia when in the service of the United States, the Navy,
or the Marine Corps, or in a foreign army. Id. at 55.
101. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1916, 74(N).
102. Ibid.
103. Id. at 133-34.
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enlisted.' The paragraph heading is labeled "statutory rules of
evidence."' 5 While the authority of this provision is somewhat
lessened by the fact that it was written by Dean John H. Wig-
more of Northwestern University Law School, 11 Crowder's close
personal friend and "father confessor"' 07 when the latter was a
civilian,"0s nevertheless it undoubtedly reflected Crowder's views,
and can be taken as authoritative.
Finally, and of the most significance, is the discussion of the of-
fense under the punitive articles. The Manual clearly states that
re-enlistment without discharge:
is, by the twenty-ninth article, made sufficient evidence of desertion.
In such a case, proof of the intent permanently to stay away from his
former place of service and of the status of absence without leave
therefrom are unnecessary.109
The Manual, under the section discussing proof and after setting
forth the elements of the statute, declares: "In this case proof of
the absence without leave and of the intention not to return be-
come unnecessary.""'  The status of re-enlistment desertion as
a species of constructive desertion, not dependent upon the ac-
cused's intent to return, could hardly be made clearer.
In connection with the above passages, it must be remembered
that Crowder was a precise draftsman and careful lawyer, not
given to loose thinking or writing. Moreover, Article 29 was of
great importance to his department. At the time of the statutory
revision, one quarter of all of the inmates of the army disciplinary
barracks were serving sentences for fraudulent enlistment or re-
enlistment. This is the reason the offense was constituted sep-
arately from the general article."' Under these circumstances, it
104. Id. at 135.
105. Id. at 134.
106. Id. at xiv. Brown, Administration of Justice in the Army, 3 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 178, 202 (1918).
107. LOCHMILLER, ENOCH H. CROWDER, SOLDIER, LAWYER, AND
STATESMAN 136, 181 (University of Missouri Studies No. 27, 1955).
108. BULL., NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL 1916-1917
(April 14, 1916) and 1917-1918 (March 17, 1917) show Dean Wigmore
as an active member of the faculty. BULL., NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL 1918-1919 (May 4, 1918), lists Dean Wigmore on leave as
a Lieutenant Colonel in the Provost-Marshal General's Department. In addi-
tion, an undated draft, in Dean Wigmore's handwriting, of a speech ob-
viously prepared, from the contents, after 1919, found among the Crowder
papers, states: "In September and October, 1916, I had shared in the
preparation of the revised edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial, Major
Blanton Winship having come to Chicago for the purpose. I was called to
active duty on July 13, 1917."
109. MANUAL FOR CouRTs-MARTIAL U.S. ARmy 1916, at 201.
110. Id. at 202.
111. Comparative Print, supra note 99, at 33.
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hardly can be supposed that Crowder overlooked the significance
of this language.
Moreover, contemporaneous construction by the Judge Advo-
cate General's office during World War I reinforces the above
view. For example, one opinion held that where "a soldier in the
United States Army Reserve enlisted in the Canadian Army in
1916" he "thereby became guilty of desertion."" Likewise, it
was held that the testimony of the post adjutant that the accused
"was reported as being absent," together with his counsel's state-
ment in argument that "he [the accused] deserted the land service
and entered the marine service" was sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion of desertion."' Another opinion held that a soldier who en-
listed in the naval reserve "violated the twenty-ninth article of
war."
11 4
Textwriters of the period also agreed with the view that "a
soldier who, without having received a discharge, again enlists, is
ipso facto guilty of desertion and no proof of intention is neces-
sary.""' 5 Thus, Professor Edmund M. Morgan, a lieutenant col-
onel in the Judge Advocate General's office during World War
I, declared that "in the 29th Article of 'War, desertion is consum-
mated only by actual enlistment in some other branch of the
United States service or in a foreign army.""' Here again, it is
clear that the contemporary understanding was that re-enlistment
112. Op. JAG 014.33 (Feb. 11, 1919) (TJAGA Lib.). In Op. JAG
251.29 (Jan. 20, 1919) (TJAGA Lib.), it was held:
Former members of the United States military service who desert-
ed therefrom and enlisted and served honorably in the forces of Gov-
ernments associated with this country in the prosecution of the war,
are guilty of desertion under the twenty-ninth article of war. Honor-
able service with an ally does not excuse the offense of desertion.
Prosecutions in such cases are largely a question of policy for the War
Department . . . .There is no doubt that as a matter of law these
men are guilty of desertion under the twenty-ninth article of war.
113. CM 120354 (1918), Di. Ops. JAG (1912-40) § 416(6), at 267.
114. Op. JAG 251.29 (Dec. 20, 1918), Ops. JAG 1087-8 (1918), di-
gested in DIG. Ops. JAG (1912-40) § 1302(2), at 648. See also Op. JAG,
Oct. 4, 1917, and note Op. JAG, June 1, 1918, Ops. JAG 422 (1918), di-
gested Ibid.
115. SCOTT, HANDBOOK OF MILrrARY L w (1918). See also Mac
Chesney, The Punitive Articles of War, 61 J. MILITARY SERVICE INST. OF
U.S. 265, 266 (1917): "If an undischarged soldier again enlists in the mili-
tary service of the United States this establishes a desertion as from the
former place of service."
HAWLEY, MILITARY LAW DIGEST 106 (1918): "reenlistment without a
regular discharge is sufficient proof" of desertion. Id. at 157: "In this case
proof of the absence without leave and of the intention not to return be-
come unnecessary." See MuNSON, MILTARY LAw 37 (1923).
116. MORGAN, NOTES ON MILITARY LAW 18 (1920) (mimeographed copy
TJAGA Lib.).
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desertion constitutes a form of constructive desertion in which the
intent of the accused was immaterial.
In the Articles of War of 1920,117 former Article 29, the re-
enlistment desertion section, was combined with Article 28, the
officer-resignation desertion section, and added to a new section
denouncing absence without leave with intent to avoid hazardous
duty or shirk important service, (known as "short desertion,")
to form a new Article 28. The text of the re-enlistment desertion
section was not changed, but the new title of the article read: "Cer-
tain acts to constitute desertion." In light of the legislative history
of the 1920 revision, discussed below, the failure to make any
changes is of great significance.
When analyzing the importance of the legislative history, we
first must remember that according to the then current Manual
for Courts-Martial, a soldier who absented himself without leave
with intent to report at another post was considered guilty of de-
sertion even though he did not re-enlist or conceal his status or
identity. This was entirely aside from the special constructive de-
sertion statute." 8 As Morgan, close friend and confidant of the
then Acting Judge Advocate General Samuel T. Ansell, declared:
"An unauthorized absence coupled with the intention to dissolve
or terminate the existing military status also constitutes desertion."
He likewise noted that the manual definition makes "unauthorized
absence with the intention of terminating and dissolving the mili-
tary status and obligation constitute desertion whether the inten-
tion to reenlist in another branch of the service or in a foreign
army is actually consummated or not."" 9 We can hardly suppose
that Ansell was unaware of this provision, inasmuch as he signed
all of the opinions of the Judge Advocate General during 1917
and 1918 while Crowder was on leave as Provost Marshal Gen-
eral.120
The re-enlistment desertion section became embroiled in the
famous Ansell-Chamberlain-Crowder controversy of 1919 when
Senator Chamberlain introduced the Ansell articles which dropped
the statute and only punished re-enlistment of an undischarged
soldier as fraudulent enlistment.'" The purpose of Ansell's in-
117. 41 Stat. 787.
118. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1916, at 201. See also
MUNSON, MILITARY LAW 37 (1923): "Nor is it a defense that the deserter
at the time of departure intended to report for duty elsewhere."
119. MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 116.
120. Confidential memorandum from Lt. Col. Frederic G. Bauer to the
Judge Advocate General, July 7, 1920, Crowder Papers.
121. Hearings on S. 64, a Bill to Establish Military Justice, Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 66th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10, 14 (1919).
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novation was to change "the harsh rule (art. 29) which punishes
as a deserter a man who quits one organization to enter another,
and [to make] the offense one of fraudulent enlistment only. 122
The Kernan-O'Ryan-Ogden Board, set up by Crowder to "study"
military justice so as to allay widespread criticisms of courts-mar-
tial, and which heavily influenced the drafting of the 1920 Arti-
cles of War,123 took a dim view of Ansell's proposal. They de-
clared:
The change proposed by article 53 of the Chamberlain bill would en-
able a soldier in time of war, who sought to avoid battle, to desert
his organization in the face of the enemy and protect himself from
the consequences of such desertion by fraudulently enlisting in an or-
ganization not serving at the front.'2 4
In light of the fact that Crowder gives the Kernan Board's view
as the reason for not adopting the Ansell proposal, 5 the latter
merits a moment of careful analysis.
As noted above, it was well-settled at the time that a soldier
who quit his unit with the intent not to return, although he may
have intended to report to another unit, was guilty of desertion re-
gardless of whether he re-enlisted. Ansell does not seem to have
dissented from this proposition; rather, he used it as the basis for
an interpretative extension of desertion to cover absence without
leave with intent to avoid hazardous duty." 6 Indeed, he told a
Senate Subcommittee which was considering the 1920 Articles of
War that the re-enlistment desertion article was "an extension of
the definition of desertion."'127 Hence, its elimination could not
help a soldier who intended to transfer himself permanently, but
only one whose intended transfer was temporary. That this was
122. Army Articles-Comparative Print Showing the Bill (S. 64) to Es-
tablish Military Justice, as Introduced by Mr. Chamberlain, Together with
the Present Articles of War, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1919).
123. Note, The New Articles of War, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 477, 478
(1921); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1921, at v-vii.
124. PROCEEDINGS AND REPORT OF SPECIAL WAR DEPARTMENT BoARD
ON COURTS-MARTIAL AND THEIR PROCEDURE 31 (1919). It is interesting to
note that the situation envisaged is the precise opposite of that set forth
by Mr. Justice Brennan in his interpretation of the statute in Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 113 (1958).
125. Comparative Print (Articles of War), Showing Changes Proposed
by the Judge Advocate General as Compared with the Changes Proposed
by the Kernan-O'Ryan-Ogden Board and with Existing Law, for Senate
Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, 32 (1919).
126. Avins, supra note 84, at 154-55. See also Morgan, The Existing
Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L.J. 52, n.2
(1919): "The formerly accepted definition of desertion has been broadened
by interpretation during the late war."
127. Hearings, supra note 121, at 251.
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the object of the Keman Board's remarks is further shown by the
Board's attention to the case of a soldier attempting to avoid a
battle. His object would be realized by but a temporary absence
from his unit; and if he were in a combat zone, like France, he
risked detection and apprehension unless he could attach himself
to another unit. Re-enlistment for a temporary period might well
serve to hide him until combat ceased. Accordingly, the contro-
versy over this article stemmed from the Keman Board's desire
to punish temporary re-enlistees as deserters.
Crowder's rejection of Ansell's proposal to drop the re-enlist-
ment-desertion article is not surprising. While Crowder had at one
time entertained a high opinion of Ansell's ability, 28 though al-
ways with reservations concerning his ambition,'29 by 1919 An-
sell's attacks on his erstwhile mentor had embittered the latter not
only towards Ansell himself' 30 but also towards Ansell's friends
and supporters.' Although Crowder adopted some of his former
128. In a letter from Gen. Crowder to Maj. Gen. 1. Franklin Bell, Chief
of Staff of the Army, June 20, 1913, located in the Crowder Papers, the
former stated: "In Ansell I have a man of such transcendent ability in
the law as would make him formidable in the civil practice in any court,
State or Federal-a man who is capable of standing on the same plane
with Elihu Root."
129. Letter to Colonel H. C. Carbaugh, March 6, 1912, found in the
Crowder Papers, in which Crowder declared: "In Captain Ansell we have
a strong man, whose usefulness is impaired only by an excessive ego, which
causes him to think of himself twice when he thinks of the Government
once. I am compelled to overlook this personal defect."
130. Letter to Congressman Julius Kahn, Chairman of the House Mili-
tary Affairs Committee, July 7, 1919, in the Crowder Papers, in which
Crowder wrote that Ansell was "a man intent upon revenge and imbued
with Bolshevistic characteristics which have kept him detached from other
officers of the Army in looking about for betterments to the Code."
131. In a letter of April 5, 1920, in the Crowder Papers, Crowder wrote
to former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson:
The Bolshevists in the Senate and the House both know that they
are licked already on the court-martial controversy.
The Republican smelling committee, an important member of which
is Royal C. Johnson of South Dakota, friend of Ansell, and who is
also a member of the Rules Committee, purchased Ansell's treason to
the military establishment and made him an attorney for that smelling
committee.
Crowder also became embittered at Professor Edmund M. Morgan of Yale
Law School, the evidence expert, for his support of Ansell in his article,
supra note 126. In writing to William Marshall Bullett, in a letter of No-
vember 4, 1919, to ask whether he would write a rebuttal to Morgan,
Crowder said:
Morgan must have some mental aptitude but he is primarily a school
man with no practical sense. I have no hesitation in saying that he is
the smallest man from the standpoint of character that I have ever
come into contact with and three minutes conversation with him
shows this littleness of his soul. He is the kind of man who is abso-
lutely under another man's domination and leadership.
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protege's innovations which strengthened the articles of war,"3 2
his rejection of changes looking towards leniency reflected his
character as a strong disciplinarian and firm upholder of the pow-
ers of field commanders. Accordingly, he recommended that Con-
gress not change the re-enlistment desertion provision. 3
The Ansell-Chamberlain bill, tacked on to the Army Reor-
ganization Bill when the latter was nearing passage in the Senate,
was ultimately discarded. The Senate amended the bill, as Crowd-
er notes, "by striking out the entire measure following the enact-
ing clause and substituting therefor the text substantially as it ap-
pears in the law as passed, a text prepared very largely in my of-
fice, reflecting my own views and recommendations and reject-
ing the vitals of Senator Chamberlain's proposed revision."'13 In
urging the passage of new Article of War 28, Crowder told the
Senate Subcommittee that the re-enlistment and officer resigna-
tion provisions "define two acts constituting desertion."' 35
Crowder's meaning that the provisions of Article of War 28,
which declare "certain acts to constitute desertion," are statutory
rules of evidence, may be gleaned from some of Wigmore's con-
temporary writings. Wigmore recognized that statutes which make
a species of evidence sufficient to prove a proposition are really
rules of substantive law, 36 and he does not dispute the power of
the legislature to thus redefine crimes.3 7 The whole sum of
Crowder's actions towards re-enlistment desertion shows that he
is treating it as a species of constructive desertion, in the Holt-
132. The provision in respect to short desertion originated with Ansell.
See Avins, supra note 84, at 162.
133. Comparative Print, supra note 125.
134. Memorandum of General Crowder, August 2, 1920, p. 3 (Crowder
Papers). See also Rigby, Military Penal Law: A Brief Survey of the 1920 Re-
vision of the Articles of War, 12 J. ClIM. L. 84, 85 (1921); 59 CONG.
REc. 5836, 5838, 5843-45 (1920).
135. Comparative Print, supra note 125.
136. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1344 (2d ed. 1923):
May not the apparent cases of conclusive preference be explainable
as in truth results of other independent principles of substantive law,
sometimes loosely dealth with in terms of "conclusive evidence"? No
doubt this is the true explanation of most of the instances in which
such a term is employed, and it remains to ascertain whether, after
all such explanations, there exist any instances of conclusive prefer-
ence in the shape of genuine rules of evidence.
See also § 1353(1), where Wigmore declares:
On the one hand, so far as a so-called rule of conclusive evidence is
not a rule of Evidence at all, but a rule of substantive law, it is clear
that the Legislature is not infringing upon the prerogative of the ju-
diciary to determine the truth of a fact in issue.
137. Id. at § 1354.
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Winthrop tradition, and not as proof of intent, as the Dunn-Davis
group espouses.
If the label of "rule of evidence" on Article 28 of 1920 proves
anything more, it proves too much. If it demonstrates, as the
Court of Military Appeals believes, that the re-enlistment desertion
section was meant only as a way of proving intent to leave the
first organization permanently, then by the same token the short
desertion provision must likewise be evidence only of straight de-
sertion. But the Court of Military Appeals has always held that
straight desertion is quite different from short desertion 38 and,
although there was some authority to support the contrary view
when the statute was first enacted in 1920, the overwhelming
weight of authority favors the court's position."3 9 Accordingly,
the presence of short desertion in Article of War 28 at least dem-
onstrates the negative proposition that the physical location of re-
enlistment desertion in the statutory scheme proves nothing as to
its meaning, and hence other evidence must be deemed control-
ling.
Upon passage of the 1920 Articles of War, Crowder set about
to revise the Manual for Courts-Martial. In this endeavor, he once
again had the assistance of Dean Wigmore, 40 who was shortly
to call him a "genius."'' The portions of the Manual relevant to
138. Avins, The Relation Between Short Desertion and Other Absence
Offenses, 38 U. DET. L.J. 447 (1961).
139. Avins, supra note 84, at 156-65.
140. The Crowder Papers contain two letters from Crowder to Wigmore,
dated June 11, 1920 and June 14, 1920, in reference to a particular case
and the applicability of the manual. Included is Wigmore's reply of June
18, 1920 wherein he suggested changes in the manual. In addition, a letter
from Crowder to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker dated June 1,
1920, states:
As you are aware, the Army Reorganization Bill carries a revision of
the Articles of War. Immediately upon its signature by the President,
the work of revising the Manual of Procedure must be commenced
and be vigorously prosecuted. I wish very much to consult with Pro-
fessor Wigmore of the Northwestern University and obtain his expres-
sion as a Reserve officer in the preparation of the Revised Manual,
particularly the chapter on Evidence, and to discuss with him certain
modifications of the Chapter on Evidence now in order that he may
have time to study the important changes which I wish to bring to his
attention.
By order of the same date, the Secretary provided:
1. You [Crowder] are hereby directed to proceed from Washing-
ton, D.C., to Chicago, Illinois, and return ... to consult with Pro-
fessor Wigmore of the Northwestern Law University, respecting his
cooperation as a Reserve Officer in the preparation of the revised
Manual for Court Martial Procedure under the new Articles of War,
particularly the chapter on Evidence.
141. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4d(2) (2d ed. 1923).
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re-enlistment desertion were not altered.' However, forms for
violation of the various provisions of Article of War 28, including
one for re-enlistment desertion,'43 were added to the specimen
forms for charges and specifications in the appendix to the Manu-
al. The form for violation of this provision, charged under the
general desertion article, contains nothing more than an allegation
of the statutory language, and does not mention intent. This is one
more item of evidence which shows that the provision constituted
constructive desertion.'
In discussing the statutory revisions of 1916 and 1920, the re-
search of the Court of Military Appeals is once again grossly de-
ficient.14 However, the court does set forth the two most rele-
vant provisions of the 1916 Manual, one indeed in italics. Not-
withstanding the fact, as discussed above, that these two provi-
sions indelibly stamp the re-enlistment desertion article as con-
structive desertion, making "proof . . . of the intention not to
return . . . unnecessary," the court concludes that the article is
merely designed to prove intention to remain absent permanently.
Here we come to an apt illustration of another great weakness
of the Court of Military Appeals-its repeated inability to appre-
ciate the significance of important material which it actually finds.
The material in the 1916 Manual is in pari materia with the statu-
tory revision and hence is of great significance in interpreting the
revision of the Articles of War. Nevertheless, the court by-passes
this with hardly a word of analysis.
In many recent opinions, the court has failed to grasp the im-
portance and true meaning of material presented to it. It seems to
lack a sufficient background in military law to enable it to properly
use such material. Time and again it has misinterpreted relevant
authority because of an utter failure to discern the proper rela-
tionship between the precedent and the body of military law as a
whole. The result has been to distort not only the meaning and
significance of the authority itself, but also to twist the body of
the military law completely out of shape. This in turn prevents the
military law from performing its proper function of deterrence.
142. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTAL, U.S. ARMY 1921, 54-55, 227,
343, 345.
143. Id. at 570-71.
144. See also Crowder's opinion in Op. JAG 300.7 (Feb. 17, 1922)
(TJAGA Lib.) which holds that a soldier who leaves his post with the in-
tention of going to another post to re-enlist is a deserter.
145. United States v. Johnson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 302--03, 17 C.M.R.
297, 302-03 (1954).
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IV. HOW CROWDER'S INTENTION IN RESPECT TO
RE-ENLISTMENT DESERTION WAS FORGOTTEN
AFTER WORLD WAR I
In 1923, General Crowder retired. He was succeeded as Judge
Advocate General by Brigadier General Walter A. Bethel, who
had worked closely under Crowder as the latter's assistant for the
American Expeditionary Forces.146 Under Bethel's administration,
which lasted less than two years, the re-enlistment desertion section
continued to be treated as constructive desertion. Thus, a board
of review declared that "Article 28 makes the fraudulent enlist-
ment . . . conclusive of such intent" not to return to the prior
enlistment." 7 And in an opinion, General Bethel said that Ar-
ticle of War 28 creates
a presumption of law that one who reenlists without a regular dis-
charge does not intend to return to the service within the meaning of
the definitions of desertion. It was plainly within the power of the
Congress in enacting the Articles of War to create this presumption.
In the opinion of this office the effect of the statute has been salu-
tar. 148
General Bethel was succeeded in 1924 as Judge Advocate Gen-
eral by Colonel John A. Hull, who had served as judge advocate
of a subordinate American force in France during World War I,
and thus was not intimately connected with the Ansell-Chamber-
lain-Crowder controversy or the several revisions of the Articles of
War and the Manual for Courts-Martial.9 Early the following
year, General Hull was required to pass on a case which was to
146. Fratcher, History of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, United
States Army, 4 MILITARY L. REv. 89, 105 (1959).
147. CM 155157, Burgess, (March 29, 1923) (TJAGA Lib.). See also
CM 160766 (1924), DIG. O,'s. JAG (1912-40), § 416(15): "Accused was
found guilty of desertion in that without having received a regular discharge
he again enlisted in the Army."
148. Op. JAG 251.19 (Nov. 30, 1923) (TIAGA Lib.).
149. Fratcher, supra note 146, at 105. In Hearings, supra note 121, at
1121-22, Hull himself declared:
Since last November I have been on special duty as finance officer of
the American Expeditionary Forces . . . so that I have not had an
opportunity . . . either to read the bill or study the reports mention-
ed .... SENATOR WARREN. You will find in this print, in parallel
columns, the present Articles of War and Senator Chamberlain's sug-
gested substitute as contained in the bill.
COL. HULL. I am sorry to say that this is the first time I have seen
that. I tried to get a copy of that in France, but it was not available;
and since then, as I have said, I have not had the time.
Compare this with the intimate correspondence between Bethel and
Crowder on court-martial reform. Id. at 973-74.
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have a profound effect on the interpretation of the re-enlistment
desertion section.
In Connover's case,"50 the staff judge advocate of the com-
mand from which the case arose, Colonel Moreland, wrote a memo-
randum to the Judge Advocate General setting forth his views as
to the correct interpretation of the re-enlistment desertion sec-
tion.'5 ' He first contended that the Manual for Courts-Martial
was incorrect in stating that Article 28 created a rule of evidence,
rather than defining an offense, and that violation of it should be
punished under Article 58, the punitive desertion article, rather
than under Article 96, the general article. He said:
But it is to be observed that the 28th Article of War does not require,
to constitute the desertion therein set out, that there be a misrepre-
sentation or concealment of any kind with respect to a prior enlist-
ment. Such desertion would be consummated even though the soldier
fully disclosed his prior enlistment to the recruiting officer and openly
declared that it was still subsisting, provided, of course, that he was
enlisted despite such disclosure. Moreover, such an enlistment with
such a disclosure, would be, under said Article of War 28, not only a
desertion but a fraudulent enlistment also. It is, of course, hardly con-
ceivable that a man would be again enlisted after such a disclosure;
but he might be, and if he were, his act of enlistment would constitute
under Article of War 28 both desertion and fraudulent enlistment. Ob-
serve, now, that in such case, there would be a fraudulent enlistment
without any misrepresentation or concealment, and without the ele-
ment of receiving 'pay or allowances under such enlistment'; and a de-
sertion without absence without leave and without an intent to desert,
it being possible that a soldier might reenlist while on furlough and re-
turn to his proper station and organization in a few hours and before
the expiration thereof. * * * Thus, the act of charging under Article
of War 58 the offense made desertion by Article of War 28 is arbi-
trary to the last degree since there is a charge under an Article of War
which defines an offense containing precisely and only two elements,
(a) AWOL and (b) the animo non revertendi, neither one of which,
-concededly, needs to be proved to establish the offense actually charg-
ed. That is to say, the strange spectacle is thus presented of charging
an offense under a penal clause which in no wise defines the offense
charged. This is a thing unheard of. Persons are charged under stat-
utes which define the offenses they are alleged to have committed.
That is the only possible reason for charging them under or in viola-
tion of statutes.' 52
Colonel Moreland went on to contend that because Article of
War 58 punishes one kind of desertion, there is no reason "for
150. CM 164528, Connover, (Feb. 17, 1925) (TJAGA Lib.).
151. Memorandum of Colonel Moreland, Staff Judge Advocate, Canal
Zone, dated February 4, 1925 (TJAGA Lib.).
152. Ibid.
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charging under that article the offense defined in Article of War
28, which is an entirely different kind of desertion." He contend-
ed that offenses should be charged under statutes which define
them, and not under those which punish them. Moreover, he ar-
gued that the general desertion article does not punish re-enlist-
ment desertion merely because it punishes desertion, which by
military common law means AWOL with intent not to return,
and the offense under that article is as well defined as if set forth
in the article in detail. The colonel, using an inapt analogy, also
disagreed with the theory that Article of War 28 enlarges the
definition of desertion, thereby permitting re-enlistment to be charg-
ed as desertion.
Colonel Moreland disagreed with the concept of Article 28 as a
rule of evidence because "no rule of evidence theretofore known
is changed in the slightest degree" and because the article does
not state that it is such a rule. He further stated:
If it is a rule of evidence it must be a rule which governs or, at least,
deals with the proof or establishment of some offense. . . .But
with respect to what offense is it a rule of evidence? If it is a rule of
evidence it cannot refer to an offense which it itself defines, since if
it was (1) it would not be a rule of evidence any more than the defini-
tion of larceny is a rule of evidence as to larceny, and (2) such a theory
would be contrary to the basic assumption that the Article is a rule of
evidence, since, in such a case, it would constitute a definition of an
offense and not a rule of evidence. The definition of an offense can
never be a rule of evidence because, while the mere definition of the
offense informs as to what is necessary to be proved to establish the
offense defined, it itself lays down no rules as to how to prove the of-
fense, or what the weight or effect of any given piece of evidence will
be.
The Colonel declared, in addition, that the facts found in Ar-
ticle 28 have no relation to desertion. 5 ' He then said that if the
re-enlistment section was a rule of evidence as to the elements of
desertion, it must be a conclusive rule, and accordingly unconsti-
153. Moreland wrote:
Having already seen that it is not a rule of evidence as to the of-
fense which the Article itself defines and denounces, it must, if it is
a rule of evidence at all, be such with reference to an offense created
by some other Article of War. What is that Article? Note that the
Article in question deals directly with only two acts, (1) the attempt
to avoid the results of one enlistment and (2) the entering into an-
other. Now, with relation to what offense can these two facts possibly
be evidence? The answer is, and must of necessity be, 'None.' These
facts cannot, of course, be pertinent to larceny, perjury, murder, etc.
No more can they be pertinent to desertion as found in the 58th Ar-
tice of War, since the facts to be established under that Article are
(1) absence without leave, and (2) intent not to return to the service.
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tutional 54 Therefore, he concluded that "Article of War 28 de-
fines a new offense which it calls desertion," basing this both on
the fact that it employs the form and language used in statutes to
define offenses, and on the language of the 1921 Manual.
The validity of this thesis-that Article 28 defined new offenses
with elements different from desertion--can hardly be disputed in
light of the legislative history of the article. This article is a rule
of evidence only in the very special sense that proof of the ele-
ments therein are proof of the whole of the crime. This, as noted
above, amounts to a redefinition of the crime in question. There
is nothing to prevent the legislature from thus redefining crimes.
Should Congress provide that all persons who shall sign their
names on enlistment blanks with red ink instead of blue ink shall
be deemed to be guilty of fraudulent enlistment, and be punished
accordingly, no one would suppose that such a statute could be
construed as making a signature in red ink evidence of intent to
conceal a material fact or to falsify any statement in the applica-
tion. The only possible construction would be that signing in red
ink is made criminal, and there now would be two species of the
offense instead of one.
The mere fact that re-enlistment is evidence of intent to aban-
don the prior enlistment does not warrant any change in this rule.
Intent to avoid hazardous duty or shirk important service is evi-
dence of intent to remain away permanently,'55 but it has never
been supposed that because of this short desertion was merely evi-
dence of straight desertion. The fact that Congress could logically
and constitutionally have made any of the three sets of acts in
Article of War 28 evidence of intent to remain away permanently
does not prove that it did so. Yet this fallacy has been indulged in
repeatedly.
Moreover, there is no reason why Congress could not label as
desertion, the acts denounced in Article of War 28, or any other
criminal acts, and require that they be punished as such. If it is
arbitrary to label fraudulent re-enlistment as desertion, it is no
less arbitrary to label the other two offenses under the article as
desertion. But as Mr. Justice Holmes once observed, "upon this
point a page of history is worth a volume of logic."'56 Historically,
154. To sustain this proposition, he cited: 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 43 (11th ed. 1912); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1353 (2d ed. 1923); and
the following cases: Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Bailey v. Ala-
bama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Mobile, J. & K. C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.
S. 35 (1910). See also Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
155. E.T.O. 16880, Ferrara, 31 E.T.O. 219, 221 (1945).
156. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
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each of these offenses has had a close affinity with desertion."
Tradition makes the absurd seem rational, and the arbitrary seem
logical.
General Hull, in his reply to Colonel Moreland's memoran-
dum, 5 ' correctly points out that for at least 40 years re-enlist-
ment desertion has been punished under the general desertion ar-
ticle, and that it is clear that General Crowder intended this in his
revisions of the statute. However, he then declares that: "irrespec-
tive of any legislation on the subject, proof that a soldier was
absent from his organization and had re-enlisted in another or-
ganization without a discharge from his first organization, would
be complete proof under the 58th Article of War of absence with-
out leave and of an intention not to return." He arrives at this
conclusion by assuming the latter completely, and saying, as to the
former, that even though the soldier is on leave when he re-en-
lists, the "permission to be absent cannot extend to authorize a re-
enlistment," and accordingly, at such time, the soldier's leave is
constructively withdrawn. He then concludes that the acts de-
nounced in re-enlistment desertion prove straight desertion, and
that there is nothing objectionable in using the form for straight
desertion in the Manual and proving it through the re-enlistment
of the undischarged soldier.
From that point, however, General Hull takes a broad leap
and reasons that since re-enlistment tends to prove straight deser-
tion, that is all it was meant to do. He thus takes issue with the
several key statements in Crowder's own 1921 Manual. He says:
The statement in our existing Manual (page 345) that in case of a
soldier enlisting without a discharge "proof of the absence without
leave and of the intention not to return become unnecessary" is mis-
leading for the reason that these two elements are essential to the of-
fense of desertion. * * * the phrase quoted from page 345 standing
by itself is incorrect and undoubtedly should be changed if the Manual
is revised.
* * * I think my discussion has demonstrated that both in theory
and practice the acts described in the 28th Article of War fall com-
pletely and accurately within the centuries old definition of what con-
stitutes desertion, namely, absence without leave from a soldier's or-
ganization or post or other duty with the intent not to return thereto.
Such being the case, the executive order fully covers the act of deser-
tion being discussed. I wish again to emphasize that in my opinion there
is only one kind of desertion, the desertion described in the 58th Arti-
cle of War, and the fact of reenlistment without a discharge is merely
evidence of the elements of the offense denounced in the 58th Arti-
157. Avins, supra notes 20, 74, 84.
158. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, February 17, 1925
(TJAGA Lib.).
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cle of War. * * * I think the prescribed form of specification for the
offense is misleading in that it seems to be based upon the theory that
the act of reenlistment constitutes practically the beginning and the
end of the desertion. As I have indicated above and as I here repeat
the act of reenlistment is merely proof of absence without leave and
of the intent not to return.
Shortly thereafter, Hull assigned Lt. Col. Arthur W. Brown,
later to be the Judge Advocate General, to make a further investi-
gation of the point. Brown's initial conclusion that, as a result of
the Moreland-Hull exchange, this area was in a state of confusion,
and that contradictory rulings had recently been made by the
Judge Advocate General's office, can hardly be questioned."5 9
Brown took the position that if Article of War 28 defined the
offense of desertion, it must be exclusive, thus eliminating from
Article 58 absence without leave with intent never to return. Why
the definitions had to be exclusive, rather than additional, thereby
producing this absurd result, he did not explain. Rather, he jump-
ed to the next point, that if the re-enlistment desertion section
was considered as making re-enlistment without discharge conclu-
sive evidence of the elements of straight desertion, thus precluding
the defendant from offering any evidence that he was not AWOL
or that he intended to return, it was "undoubtedly unconstitution-
al."160 Indeed, he asserts that the statute is probably unconstitu-
tional if the clause makes such re-enlistment only prima facie proof
of the elements of straight desertion.
Brown then declared that "the most easily defended construc-
tion" of the whole article is that its clauses are "merely declaratory
or interpretative." This forces him into taking the position that
Article of War 58 may be proved with an intent not only to remain
absent permanently, but also to avoid hazardous duty or shirk
important service, a doctrine which is surely novel from any stand-
point. Brown declared that officer-resignation desertion is declara-
tory, and the other two clauses are interpretation clauses. He con-
cluded that re-enlistment without discharge is evidence of an in-
tent permanently to abandon the prior unit "but proof of the iso-
lated fact of such reenlistment does not establish absence without
leave or fraudulent enlistment," thereby contradicting not only
Crowder, but also Hull.
To shore up his conclusion, Brown declared that re-enlist-
ment without discharge was never "generally construed in prac-
tice as creating a distinct offense in the sense that a soldier who
159. Memorandum to Gen. Hull from Lt. Col. A.W. Brown, Judge Ad-
vocate, May 11, 1925 (TJAGA Lib.).
160. He cites the same cases as Moreland, supra note 154.
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deserts (i.e., quits the service and returns to civil life) and five
years later re-enlists has committed two desertions." As previously
noted, prior to 1880 it was almost invariably so construed. Thus,
his analysis is riddled both with inconsistencies and historical in-
accuracies, and his conclusions collapse with the premises on
which they are based.
In 1927, while General Hull was still Judge Advocate General,
the Manual for Courts-Martial was revised. The material contain-
ed in the 1921 Manual about intent and AWOL being unnecessary
in a re-enlistment case, was removed. The following was substi-
tuted in its place:
Such enlistment is not only no defense to a charge of desertion but is
prima facie proof of it. . . . In a case of a soldier enlisting without
discharge, the specification charging desertion should follow the
usual form, the desertion being alleged as having occurred on the date
accused absented himself without leave. If not absent without leave be-
fore he again enlisted, he becomes so absent at that time.' 61
The special form for re-enlistment desertion was also removed
from the collection of model specifications for desertion in the ap-
pendix to the Manual.' The 1949 Manual copies this wording
without substantive change.'
The reported cases are not very helpful. One case says, by way
of obiter dictum, that a specific intent is not necessary where an
undischarged soldier re-enlists,'64 while another states, also in
dictum, that the re-enlistment constitutes "prima facie proof of
desertion."' 65 Most cases of this character, however, simply hold
the evidence of desertion sufficient without detailed analysis.'66
Thus it came about that General Crowder's intention in respect
to re-enlistment desertion was forgotten, and the fact that re-en-
listment was evidence of an intent not to return to the prior en-
listment was confused with the act of re-enlistment as constructive
161. MAUAL FoR COURTS-MARmTIA, U.S. A.MY 1928, at 142. The Man-
ual also stated:
Where a soldier during one enlistment again enlists or attempts to
enlist while on a duty status or while on pass or furlough, he by that
act abandons such status of duty, pass, or furlough, and from that mo-
ment becomes absent without leave with respect to the former enlist-
ment. Id. at 143.
162. Id. at 240.
163. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U.S. ARMY 1949, 146a, at 198.
164. CM 245568, Clancy, 29 B.R. 215, 219 (1943).
165. United States v. Price, 2 (AF) C.M.R. 741, 743 (ACM 1950);
Cf. Op. JAGAF 1951-54, 3 Dia. Ops. JAGAF 15 (1951).
166. United States v. Bainbridge, 4 (AF) C.M.R. 102 (ACM 1950);
CM 233833, Parihus, 20 B.R. 165 (1943); CM 187542, Lanier, 1 B.R.
49, 52 (1929); CM 187252, Hudson, 1 B.R. 19 (1929).
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desertion itself. This error, which constituted the discarded Dunn-
Davis position, was revived by General Hull and, as a result of
his opinion, was written into the 1928 and 1949 Manuals. Accord-
ingly, insofar as these Manuals purport to interpret the re-enlist-
ment clause of Article of War 28, they are wholly worthless.
The Court of Military Appeals, notwithstanding the patent con-
flict between the 1921 Manual and the 1928 and 1949 Manuals,
however, relies heavily on the latter two to support its opinion that
Article 28 was meant merely to set forth a way of proving the
elements of straight desertion. 6 ' Here vie come to another major
deficiency which the court has repeatedly exhibited-an utter lack
of any sense of discrimination. It should be plain that if there is a
conflict between the 1921 Manual and the 1928 or 1949 Manual,
the former must be given greater weight. The reason for this is
that the 1921 Manual was a contemporaneous exposition of the
1920 Articles of War, which was written under the direction of
General Crowder, who drafted the 1920 Articles, and hence more
accurately reflects the true intent of the statute. Thus, even if the
court did not care to track down the source of the difference in
wording, and thus find the error, it still should not have changed
the result. Nevertheless, the court ignored the 1921 Manual and
dwelt at length on the 1928 and 1949 Manuals.
This lack of discrimination is not an isolated instance. On re-
peated occasions, the court has tended to treat all authorities as
though they were of equal weight, when some should have been
preferred to others. This failure has resulted in numerous errors,
and it has lowered the reliability of the court's analysis and con-
clusions.
V. THE STATUTORY REVISION IN THE UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
As previously noted, the re-enlistment desertion section of Ar-
ticle of War 28 of 1920 provided:
Any soldier who, without having first received a regular discharge,
again enlists in the Army, or in the militia when in the service of the
United States, or in the Navy or Marine Corps of the United States,
or in any foreign army, shall be deemed to have deserted the service
of the United States. 68
The current provision, Article 85(a) (3), states that:
167. United States v. Johnson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 303-04, 17 C.M.R.
297, 303-04 (1954). See also United States v. Huff, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 247,
250, 22 C.M.R. 37, 40 (1956).
168. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 2, 41 Stat. 792
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Any member of the armed forces who . . . without being regularly
separated from one of the armed forces enlists or accepts an appoint-
ment in the same or another one of the armed forces without fully
disclosing the fact that he has not been regularly separated, or enters
any foreign armed service except when authorized by the United States;
is guilty of desertion. 169
From a comparison of the two statutory provisions on their face, it
is apparent at once that the statute has been changed in a number
of respects. It has been broadened to include officers and warrant
officers; to include foreign armed services other than army forces,
and to include American armed services other than those previ-
ously enumerated. On the other hand, it has been changed to per-
mit the government to authorize entry into a foreign armed service.
In addition, re-entry into an American armed force is no longer
penalized unless accompanied without full disclosure.
The reason for a number of these changes is apparent. The
common-place nature of inter-service transfer makes it undesirable
to require a discharge before allowing re-enlistment. The full dis-
closure requirement will fully prevent fraudulent re-enlistments.
Likewise, it is undesirable that all entry into foreign military units
be barred because policy reasons may require Americans to enter
foreign service. For example, American officers may be required
to serve in foreign units as military advisors; or Americans may
have to enter foreign guerilla units operating behind enemy lines,
as was done during World War II. The creation of the Air Force
and the designation of the Coast Guard as an armed force made
it necessary to broaden the statute in respect to the American serv-
ices covered.
The inclusion of officers undoubtedly stems from two pre-Code
cases involving officers who enlisted without a prior separation,
one to escape other criminal charges, 17 and the other without ap-
parent reason. 1 While Article of War 28 was not violated in
such cases, the re-enlistment is considered evidence of intent to
abandon the service permanently, hence findings of straight deser-
tion were upheld. 2
169. UNIFORvi CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 85(a)(3), 10 U.S.C.
§ 885 (1958).
170. CM 208545, Polk, 9 B.R. 15 (1938).
171. CM 227546, Shirley, 15 B.R. 315 (1942).
172.
Although the provisions of Article of War 28 are not expressly ap-
plicable to officers who may enlist without discharge, the circum-
stances of this case, including accused's enlistment in another armed
service, raise the inescapable inference that accused intended to quit
his place of service with the Army. Desertion in violation of Article
of War 58 is thus established.
Id. at 318.
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A like result was reached in an interesting World War H case
which arose in the European Theater of Operations,173 and un-
doubtedly influenced the drafters of the statute to broaden the
prohibition against entry into foreign military service. The accused
there was a Norwegian citizen and a former seaman in the Nor-
wegian Merchant Marine. In 1942 he registered for the draft in the
United States in order to become an American citizen and was
inducted into the Army. He was sent to England where, after two
months, he applied for naturalization. When action on his appli-
cation was delayed indefinitely, he applied unsuccessfully to Amer-
ican authorities for transfer back to the Norwegian Navy. Frus-
trated again, he wrote to the Royal Norwegian Conscription Board
in London requesting its assistance, but they replied that, while
his services were urgently needed because of an acute shortage of
seamen, the accused had to get a discharge from the American
service. Accused then forged a discharge certificate, escaped from
the guardhouse where he was held, and in civilian clothes applied
to the Norwegian Conscription Board for enlistment in the Nor-
wegian Merchant Marine. However, the authorities became sus-
picious because the discharge certificate was not in proper form,
and advised accused that they would have to make an investiga-
tion. While the investigation was proceeding, he surrendered to
United States Army authorities.
Accused testified that if he had succeeded in enlisting in the
Norwegian service, he intended to write to United States Army
authorities, explain the situation, and return to American service if
he was wanted. He also stated that he thought he deserved to be a
citizen if he were going into combat and was dissatisfied because
he had not been naturalized. He stated that he would not fight well
for a country of which he was not a citizen. "I will stay in the
Army if I can get my citizen papers, but if not I want to go back
to the Merchant Marine," he testified.
A board of review upheld a finding of desertion under Article
of War 58, the straight desertion article. It quoted Article of War
28 and then said:
In view of the clear and obvious purpose, spirit and intent of this par-
ticular Article, accused's undertaking to enlist in the Norwegian Mer-
chant Marine, while undischarged as a soldier in the United States
Army, would appear to be sufficient to support the inference of req-
uisite intent to remain permanently absent, which is the essential ele-
ment of the offense of desertion. When there is taken into considera-
tion his escape from confinement, his wearing civilian clothes contrary
to regulations in wartime, his forgery of a discharge certificate, and
173. E.T.O. 3062, Osther, 8 E.T.O. 283 (1944).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
attempted fraudulent deception by the use of it and his testimony in
explanation of his plans, intention and attitude with reference to his
service in the United States Army, no doubt remains that the court's
inference was correctly drawn.17 4
The board did not discuss the fact that accused did not actually
enlist, but merely attempted to enlist, and the further fact that the
Norwegian Merchant Marine was not a "foreign army." The use
it makes of Article 28 is ambiguous. The best inference to be
drawn is that the board is holding that attempted enlistment into
a foreign service other than an army is equally probative of intent
to remain away permanently as actual enlistment in a foreign army,
the latter being specifically covered by Article 28. Thus, we see
once again that the facts which underlie a charge of unauthorized
re-enlistment play a dual role, first as constituting the basis for a
charge of constructive desertion, and second, as evidence in some
instances of intent to remain away permanently. This case also
illustrates the fact that acts not precisely constituting constructive
desertion under the statute, but analogous thereto, are equally
probative of the intent necessary for straight desertion.
When Article 85 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was
drafted by enlarging on Articles of War 58 and 28,y the dual
nature of re-enlistment desertion was not overlooked. After com-
menting on the fact that the Navy punished re-enlistment on the
part of an undischarged sailor by using the fact of re-enlistment
as proof of intent to abandon the prior contract of service,176 the
drafters of the Code declared:
Under either system, an attempt by a man to enlist without first hav-
ing received a regular discharge from a prior enlistment is probably
chargeable as desertion rather than attempted desertion. The attempt,
though unsuccessful, could be used as evidence of an intent to aban-
don the first contract of enlistment permanently. This, plus absence
without leave, constitutes desertion.177
174. Id. at 286-87.
175. Hearings on H.R. 2498 (U.C.M.J.) Before a Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 605, 1225 (1949).
176. Larkin, Comparative Studies Notebook-Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Committee on a Uniform Code of Military Justice 4-5 (unpub-
lished mimeograph, Jan. 6, 1949, TJAGA Lib.). The Committee said:
A.G.N. does not have a specific provision making it an offense of de-
sertion to enlist again in a military organization without having first
received a regular discharge from a prior enlistment. In practice,
however, the Navy treats such an act as a violation of its articles
making desertion an offense. Section 76, NC & B, defines desertion
in part as the intent to abandon permanently the pending contract of
enlistment plus A.W.O.L. or A.O.L. Proof of this is absence and sub-
sequent fraudulent enlistment.
177. Id. at 5.
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The Manual for Courts-Martial is somewhat more conservative.
After setting forth the elements of constructive desertion, the Man-
ual declares that a serviceman who, while AWOL, enlists or ac-
cepts another appointment in the manner forbidden by Article
85(a) (3) may be guilty of straight desertion because the entry
into the new service may be evidence of intent to abandon the old
permanently.178 The Manual is silent on the probative effect of
an attempt to enter a new service, although surely it would seem
that this action is of no less significance as far as straight desertion
is concerned.
On the next page, the Manual goes on to copy, from prior
Manuals, the statement originally made by General Hull, that a
serviceman who even attempts to re-enlist becomes ipso facto
AWOL." 9 There is a serious question whether such a rule would
be true if it were not stated in the Manual. However, the state-
ment in the Manual, a valid presidential order, must be taken as a
limitation on all leaves of absence, which therefore makes the
leave terminate upon a condition subsequent.80 Accordingly, by
a most interesting bootstraps operation, the Manual makes binding
a rule of substantive law which it creates within itself. Under the
peculiar circumstances, this result appears to be valid.'
However, if a serviceman goes AWOL, as soon as he attempts
to re-enlist, desertion under Article 85(a) (1) is complete at that
point if the man intended not to return. Accordingly, the Manual's
limitation of such cases to those where the accused is already
AWOL seems unjustified, if by doing so the Manual is referring
to cases where there is a pre-existing unauthorized absence. If
the Manual, however, is also referring to cases where the unau-
thorized absence commences at the moment of re-enlistment, then
178. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTAL, U.S. 1951, 164a.
179. Id. at 313. Legal and Legislative Basis, Manual for Courts-Martial,
U.S., 1951, at 253, states:
Under the Uniform Code a member of an armed force who is absent
without proper authority, and who then enlists or accepts an appoint-
ment in the same or another armed force, may be guilty of committing
desertion under Subdivision (a) (1) of Article 85, that is, by being ab-
sent without authority with intent to remain away permanently, the
intent being evidenced by his act of enlisting or accepting an appoint-
ment or entering a foreign armed service. Subdivision (a) (3) covers
the situation where an unauthorized absence is not necessarily involv-
ed; the accused could be on an authorized leave or liberty and his
wrongful act of enlistment or accepting an appointment, or entry into
the service of a foreign armed service, without more would complete
the offense of desertion.
180. Avns, THE LAw oF AWOL 88 (1957).
181. But cf. United States v. Johnson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 488, 22 C.M.R.
278 (1957).
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the limitation is meaningless, since all possible individuals are en-
compassed within its folds. Thus, the Manual states that if an ab-
sentee re-enlists, he may become a deserter under Article 85(a)
(1). However, if all who re-enlist become absentees, then it is
meaningless to limit the group to absentees. This redundancy is a
reflection of the hodge-podge created in the Manual for Courts-
Martial by attempting to fit the Hull interpretation of re-enlist-
ment desertion into a statutory framework based on the Holt-
Lieb er-Winthrop-Crowder tradition.
There has been a paucity of reported cases on desertion by re-
enlistment since the Code was passed. In one case, where the ac-
cused joined a communist guerilla unit fighting in the Philippines,
it was held that this was enough to establish an intent to desert
permanently even without reference to the statute.'82 However, in
another case, a board of review held that Article 85(a) (3) pun-
ished constructive desertion by re-enlistment, intent to remain
away permanently being unnecessary, and that such offense was
different from straight desertion, although the re-enlistment could
be used as evidence of intent to be absent permanently. 1 3
In United States v. Johnson,"8 4 the Court of Military Appeals
said: "No change of substance was made by Article 85. The pres-
ent Article is substantially a restatement of previous provisions."',"
However true this may be in respect to the other forms of deser-
tion, it is patently erroneous as applied to re-enlistment desertion.
The changes in the statute are so plain on their face that a conclu-
sion such as this can only be the result of gross carelessness.
Here again, we come to another example of a major defect in
the work product of the court. It has a tendency, at times, to be-
come inexcusably sloppy, both in research and in analysis. Unfor-
tunately, this tendency has increased of late, and no small propor-
tion of errors in the court's opinions can be attributed to it.
The court, in United States v. Johnson, concluded that the re-
enlistment desertion provision was only a statutory means for
proving intent to remain away permanently, and it pointed to the
Manual provision that re-enlistment could serve as evidence of such
intent. "' In United States v. Huff,17 the court reaffirmed this
holding over a board of review protest,' 8 and added that since
the statute merely prescribed that re-enlistment would constitute
182. United States v. Hastings, 16 C.M.R. 714 (ACM 1954).
183. United States v. Kircher, 3 C.M.R. 706, 709 (ACM 1952).
184. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 297, 17 C.M.R. 297 (1954).
185. Id. at 301.
186. Id. at 304.
187. 7 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 22 C.M.R. 37 (1956).
188. United States v. Huff, 19 C.M.R. 603 (CGCM 1955).
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evidence of intent, the accused could escape conviction by showing
that he intended to return to the first enlistment. The court did not
take up the seemingly tantalizing question why Congress should
single out re-enlistment for special statutory treatment when there
were numerous other indicia of intent to desert which were equal-
ly strong.
Thus, we find that the Court of Military Appeals, by a mis-
guided exercise in "interpretation," has managed to succeed where
even Ansell failed, by simply reading Article 85(a) (3) out of
the Code. It can hardly be doubted that this is the effect of the
court's extraordinary feat, as the law is now the same with or
without the statute. The court's opinion opens a number of gaping
holes in the military law.
For example, synthesizing the court's recently enunciated rule
that a serviceman who has a contingent intent to return is not a
deserter, s9 and the rule that one cannot "abandon" leave,"s
with the rule resulting from the court's interpretation of Article
85(a) (3), a soldier on leave could enlist over and over in dif-
ferent units and not be guilty of either desertion or AWOL, but
only of fraudulent enlistment, provided he revealed his status be-
fore his leave expired and expressed a contingent intent to return
to that unit which he liked best. Indeed, one judge of the court
has expressed the opinion that the serviceman is not even guilty
of fraudulent enlistment. 9 Crowder's skeleton must be rattling
in its grave when such a result is read into the bounty-jumping
statute.
Moreover, a serviceman on leave could, with absolute impunity,
serve during his furlough in Castro's army, provided he returned
at the end thereof. Indeed, should the man be retained by Castro
for five years after his leave expired, he would commit no offense
provided he eventually intended to return, since the serviceman
would be under duress and constraint when his leave expired and
hence, under well-settled principles of military law, be innocent
not only of desertion, but of AWOL as well.'92 Fortunately, one
scholar's dire warnings of the effect of the court's decisions on mili-
tary discipline 93 have not materialized, although only because so
189. United States v. Rushlow, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 641, 10 C.M.R. 139 (1953).
190. United States v. Johnson, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 488, 22 C.M.R. 278 (1957).
191. Judge Ferguson, dissenting in United States v. La Rue, 11 U.S.C.M.
A. 470, 478, 29 C.M.R. 286, 294 (1960).
192. See AviNs, op. cit. supra note 180, at 141-71.
193. Fratcher, Presidential Power to Regulate Military Justice: A Criti-
cal Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals, 34 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 861, 882 (1959).
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few servicemen are aware of their full scope. One shudders to
think of what would happen to discipline in the services if service-
men generally were regular readers of the court's advance sheets.
If a choice had to be made between Communist propaganda, por-
nographic material, or the decisions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals, as to which ought to be kept under lock and
key as most injurious to troop discipline and morale, this author
would be hardpressed to make a decision.
CONCLUSION
The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals in respect to re-
enlistment desertion are, admittedly, egregious and somewhat ex-
treme examples of the court's deficiency as an institution. This
fact is hardly surprising; it takes quite a series of errors to judicially
repeal a statute, and there are not enough of them in the Code for
this to be done every day. However, these two cases do exhibit
the major weaknesses of the court's performance. These weak-
nesses, in the aggregate, seriously jeopardize the usefulness of the
court itself.
A discriminating and knowledgeable investigation of the court's
functioning, without sensationalism and with close attention to
detail, is definitely called for by the new administration. Public
policy in the interpretation and administration of the military
law requires that a delicate balance be maintained between the
rights and needs of the individual and that of the military forces
as a whole. If the individual's rights are invaded, morale and ef-
ficiency will suffer under a sense of injustice. If the needs of the
service are neglected, discipline and efficiency will suffer. In addi-
tion, commanders may be tempted to use extra-legal means to
enforce discipline, resulting in lawlessness in law enforcement.
Neither the individual nor the service as a whole can afford sec-
ond-rate military justice.
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